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From Town Square to Twittersphere: 
The Public Forum Doctrine Goes Digital 
- Professor Dawn Carla Nunziato1
forthcoming 25 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. (2019) 
Minds are not changed in streets and parks as they once were. To an 
increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of ideas and shaping 
of public consciousness occur in mass and electronic media. The extent of 
public entitlement to participate in those means of communication may be 
changed as technologies change....2 
Introduction 
Government officials like President Donald J. Trump and Maryland Governor Larry 
Hogan are increasingly using popular social media sites like Twitter and Facebook to connect 
and interact with their constituents and to solicit public comment on matters of public importance 
– whether on officially-designated government platforms (like
https://www.facebook.com/GovLarryHogan/3) or on unofficial platforms used for the same 
purposes. In recent years, government officials have increasingly turned to social media 
platforms like Twitter and Facebook in place of (and in addition to) actual town halls and other 
real-space forums to solicit public participation in policy formulation and to engage with their 
constituents.  When such interactions between government officials and their constituents occur 
in real space like town halls, they fall comfortably within the scope of the First Amendment's 
public forum doctrine, which provides strong protections for freedom of speech and assembly, 
1 William Wallace Kirkpatrick Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law 
School; Co-Director, Global Internet Freedom and Human Rights Project. I am very grateful to Alexia 
Khella and Ken Rodriguez for providing excellent research and library assistance in connection with this 
article, to Kierre Hannon for excellent administrative assistance, and to Deans Naomi Cahn and Blake 
Morant for support of my research. 
2 Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 802-803 (1996) 
(Kennedy J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting 
in part) (citations omitted). 
3 Governor Larry Hogan (@GovLarryHogan), FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/GovLarryHogan. 
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and prohibits government officials from discriminating against or silencing speakers based on 
their viewpoint. However, when such interactions take place in cyberspace -- on social media 
sites like Twitter and Facebook -- the application of the First Amendment's public forum is 
somewhat less clear. Social media sites like Twitter and Facebook are privately owned, which 
raises issues for the application of the First Amendment’s public forum doctrine.  The public 
forum doctrine (which provides the greatest protection for free speech in general, as well as 
against content and viewpoint discrimination) traditionally applies to government-owned or 
government-controlled -- not privately-owned -- property.  The private ownership of social 
media sites also raises issues for the application of the First Amendment's state action doctrine, 
which provides that the restriction of speech by and through private actors does not implicate the 
First Amendment except in narrow, limited circumstances. 
 This Article examines whether and to what extent government officials' use of social 
media sites to interact with their constituents constitutes a public forum and what this forum 
analysis means for the ability of government officials to block or censor constituents on their 
social media sites. Such issues have recently arisen in the context of President Donald Trump’s 
blocking of constituents with whom he disagrees on his @realDonaldTrump/Twitter account.  
Similar issues have arisen in the context of Maryland Governor Larry Hogan’s and Virginia 
County Commissioner Phyllis Randall's blocking of constituents on their Facebook pages, in 
response to being asked challenging questions.4  The recent Supreme Court case of Packingham 
v. North Carolina5 sheds some light on the application of the public forum doctrine to social 
media sites and the use and misuse of such sites by government officials.  In particular, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Packingham extends his functional, expansive conception of                                                         
4 See text accompanying notes x - y.  
5 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
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the public forum doctrine to non-traditional forums that function as forums for public discourse.6  
In Part I of this Article, I examine in detail the circumstances surrounding recent incidents in 
which government officials have blocked constituents from following them on Twitter and from 
commenting on their Facebook pages.  Part II undertakes an analysis of the historical 
development of the public forum doctrine, its recent development in the digital age, as well as 
the government speech doctrine and the contrast between public forums and government speech. 
In Part III, I apply the forum analysis developed in Part II to the recent incidents of government 
officials' blocking constituents from accessing their social media sites, with an in-depth analysis 
of the Trump/Twitter lawsuit in particular, and conclude that such social media sites constitute 
public forums in which viewpoint discrimination is illegal.  Part IV provides suggestions to 
government officials for developing policies governing social media accounts that comply with 
the dictates of the First Amendment, and a brief conclusion follows. 
I. The Issue: Government Officials' Use of Social Media to Interact with Constituents and to 
Block Constituents on the Basis of Viewpoint 
 
 In recent years, government officials -- at the local, state, and national level -- have 
increasingly turned to social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to communicate and interact 
with their constituents.  According to the Congressional Research Service, virtually all Members 
of Congress have at least one official congressional social media account.7 Officials have done so 
both from official government accounts and from unofficial accounts that they have utilized for 
government purposes. Maryland Governor Larry Hogan created an official Facebook page to 
make official announcements and to interact with his constituents,8 while County Commissioner 
Phyllis Randall of the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors created an unofficial Facebook                                                         
6 Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1735-36. 
7 See JACOB R. STRAUS & MATTHEW E. GLASSMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOCIAL MEDIA IN 
CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA ON MEMBER COMMUNICATIONS, (2016). 
8 Governor Larry Hogan (@GovLarryHogan), FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/GovLarryHogan.  
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page for similar purposes.9  And President Donald Trump famously uses his Twitter account 
@realDonaldTrump (as well as, to a lesser extent, Twitter accounts @POTUS and 
@WhiteHouse) to interact with constituents and to provide official announcements on a variety 
of government policies.10  As the Supreme Court recently recognized in Packingham v. North 
Carolina, social media sites like Facebook and Twitter are ideal forums where "users can 
petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner."11 
 Problems arises, however, when government officials attempt to limit access to such 
forums and to restrict such forums to those who agree with them, while banning those who 
challenge or disagree with them -- as Hogan, Randall, and Trump have each recently done.12 
Governor Hogan and Commissioner Randall blocked constituents who posted critical and 
challenging comments,13 while President Trump blocked citizens from following him on Twitter 
after they posted critical comments.14  In each case, the blocked users have sued the government 
officials, claiming that these platforms constituted public forums and that their First Amendment 
rights were violated by such actions.15  The government officials have responded that their social 
media accounts do not constitute public forums, that they are making personal not government 
use of such forums, that their speech is “government speech” immune from the dictates of the                                                         
9 Chair Phyllis J. Randall, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/Chair-Phyllis-J-Randall-
1726409590911855.  
10 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump.  
11 Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1735. 
12 See text accompanying notes x - y.  
13 See e.g., Ovetta Wiggins & Fenit Nirappil, Gov. Hogan's Office Has Blocked 450 People From His 
Facebook Page in Two Years, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/gov-hogans-office-has-blocked-450-people-from-his-
facebook-page-in-two-years/2017/02/08/54a62e66-ed45-11e6-9973-
c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html?utm_term=.a9e0287239ed.  
14 See e.g., Nancy Coleman, It Doesn't Take Much for Trump to Block You On Twitter, CNN (June 9, 
2017, 9:09 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/09/politics/trump-twitter-block-users-trnd/index.html. 
15 See Complaint at 3, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017); 
Complaint at 2-3, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
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Free Speech Clause, and that in any case they enjoy the discretion to block citizens' access to 
these accounts and delete users' posts from these accounts.16 Below I turn to the details of each 
of these cases to develop a better understanding of the First Amendment interests at stake.  
A. Maryland Governor Larry Hogan Blocks Constituents and Deletes Their Comments From His 
Official Facebook Page 
 
 Maryland governor Larry Hogan established an official Facebook page -- available at 
https://www.facebook.com/GovLarryHogan -- as a means of communicating directly and 
interacting with his constituents.17  Governor Hogan uses his Facebook page as a vehicle to 
promote his positions on policy issues, to engage with his constituents, and to share information 
about his official activities as governor.18  Hogan's official Social Media Policy indicated that his 
Facebook page was established "to promote and disseminate information on Governor Larry 
Hogan's initiatives, events, and personal announcements" and to serve as a "forum for 
constructive and respectful discussion with and among users."19 However, this Policy also 
provided that constituents' comments on Hogan's Facebook page may be deleted if they are 
"inappropriate" or not on-topic, and further, that comments can be deleted -- and constituents can 
be blocked -- "at any time without prior notice or without providing justification."20 
 Since establishing his Facebook page, Hogan has blocked over 450 people from 
accessing his Facebook page after these people posted comments that the governor apparently                                                         
16 See Hogan Answer; Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 13-22, Knight First Amendment 
Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
17 Governor Larry Hogan (@GovLarryHogan), FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/GovLarryHogan. 
18 See Ovetta Wiggins, Why Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan Uses Facebook Much More Than Twitter, 
Wash. Post (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/why-maryland-gov-larry-
hogan-uses-facebook-much-more-than-twitter/2015/12/04/7762554a-87bd-11e5-be39-
0034bb576eee_story.html?utm_term=.c86e897d0ce9 (“‘The governor views social media, especially 
Facebook, as a way to talk directly to the people of this state without the interference of traditional 
media,’ Hogan spokesman Doug Mayer said. . . Hogan and his communications staff post to Facebook 
multiple times a day. . . .”). 
19 Exhibit A to Complaint, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
20 Exhibit A to Complaint, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
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viewed as challenging or critical of him.21  About half of these people were blocked after the 
2015 protests in Baltimore related to the controversial police-involved killing of Freddie Gray as 
well as following the January 2017 issuance of President Trump's executive order known as the 
Muslim ban.22   
 In one such case,  Meredith Phillips -- a Maryland citizen and former Democrat who 
crossed party lines to vote Republican for Governor Hogan -- was blocked from Hogan's 
Facebook page after she posted a comment on the page asking Hogan to make a public statement 
about President Trump's Muslim ban.23  Phillips was concerned that Maryland residents had not 
heard from Governor Hogan on the issue of Trump's recently-announced Muslim ban and sought 
to hear from the governor on the issue.24 In Phillips's first comment on Hogan's Facebook page 
on January 29, 2017 -- two days after President Trump issued the Muslim Ban -- Phillips asked 
whether Governor Hogan planned to "speak out on the Muslim ban."25 Meredith posted her 
comment in response to Hogan's then-most-recent post on his Facebook page.26  A few hours 
after posting her comment requesting that Hogan make a public statement about the Muslim ban, 
Phillips noticed that her comment had been deleted.27  Shortly thereafter, Phillips re-posted her                                                         
21 See Ovetta Wiggins & Fenit Nirappil, Gov. Hogan's Office Has Blocked 450 People From His 
Facebook Page in Two Years, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-
politics/gov-hogans-office-has-blocked-450-people-from-his-facebook-page-in-two-
years/2017/02/08/54a62e66-ed45-11e6-9973-
c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html?utm_term=.a9e0287239ed(attributing half of the blocks to “hateful or racist” 
language, according to Hogan’s spokesman). 
22 See Ovetta Wiggins & Fenit Nirappil, Gov. Hogan's Office Has Blocked 450 People From His 
Facebook Page in Two Years, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-
politics/gov-hogans-office-has-blocked-450-people-from-his-facebook-page-in-two-
years/2017/02/08/54a62e66-ed45-11e6-9973-
c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html?utm_term=.a9e0287239ed(attributing half of the blocks to “hateful or racist” 
language, according to Hogan’s spokesman).  
23 See Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
24 See Complaint at 12, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
25 See Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
26 See Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
27 See Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
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comment, adding that she "crossed party lines to vote for [Hogan]" and stating that she hoped 
Hogan would "stand up for all Marylanders and not just those that agree with [Hogan]."28  A few 
hours after posting her second comment, Phillips observed that this comment had been deleted as 
well.29  When Phillips attempted to re-post her comment for a third time, she found that she was 
restricted outright from doing so.30  Phillips further observed that posts similar to hers were 
deleted from Hogan’s Facebook page, while posts ridiculing citizens who were concerned about 
the Muslim ban were allowed to remain on the Facebook page.31  Phillips raised her concerns 
with the Governor's Office, but remained blocked from posting comments on Governor Hogan's 
official Facebook page.32 
 Molly Handley, a resident of Maryland at the time in question, also had her comments on 
the Muslim ban deleted from Governor Hogan's Facebook page.33  Soon after President Trump 
announced the Muslim ban, Handley posted comments on Hogan's Facebook page asking Hogan 
to make a public statement regarding the ban and urging others to call and ask the governor 
about his position on the topic.34  Her comments were deleted the same day that she posted them, 
and Handley also observed that other similar comments regarding the Muslim ban were 
deleted.35  
 Similarly, Maryland resident James Laurenson made comments challenging Hogan's 
policies on Hogan's Facebook page and had his comments deleted.36 In the fall of 2015, 
Laurenson posted several comments on Hogan's Facebook page on the topic of the Syrian                                                         
28 Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
29 See Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
30 See Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
31 See Complaint at 12, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
32 See Complaint at 12-13, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
33 See Complaint at 14, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
34 See Complaint at 14, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
35 See Complaint at 14, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
36 See Complaint at 9, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
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refugee crisis, asking the governor to reconsider his request to the Obama Administration to not 
allow Syrian refugees into Maryland.37  In his comments, Laurenson stated his opinion that 
turning away Syrians was the wrong response and could even be perceived by ISIS as anti-Arab 
and anti-Muslim, which could be used by ISIS against the West.38  After Laurenson made these 
comments, his comments were deleted from Hogan's Facebook page and Laurenson was blocked 
from posting any further comments on the page.39 
 As a consequence of being blocked from Hogan's Facebook page, these constituents were 
unable to engage with Governor Hogan and his other constituents regarding matters of public 
importance relating to Hogan's governance. 
 
B. Loudoun County, Virginia, Commissioner Phyllis J. Randall Deletes Constituent's Critical 
Comments from her Unofficial Facebook Page  
 
 Phyllis Randall is the Chair of the Loudoun County, Virginia, Board of Supervisors,40 
which is the branch of local government responsible for adopting policies and ordinances and 
appropriating funds for Loudoun County, Virginia.41 Randall set up a Facebook page -- the 
“Chair Phyllis J. Randall” Facebook page -- to interact with her constituents.42  She titled her 
Facebook page "Chair Phyllis J. Randall, Government Official," and in the About section of the 
page, she included her title "Chair of the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors" and provided 
links to Loudoun County's official website featuring her profile.43 The Facebook page featured 
images of Randall in front of a United States flag with a plaque inscribed "Phyllis J. Randall                                                         
37 See Complaint at 9, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
38 See Complaint at 9, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017). 
39 See Complaint at 10, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).  
40 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 707 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
41 See Board of Supervisors, VIRGINIA LOUDOUN COUNTY, https://www.loudoun.gov/bos (last visited 
July 29, 2018). 
42 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 707. 
43 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 707-08. 
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Chair-At-Large."44  On her Facebook page, Randall expressly solicits "back and forth" 
communications with and interactions from her constituents and indicates that the page is to be a 
channel through which her constituents should reach out to her and interact with her.45   On this 
Facebook page, she indicates: "Everyone, could you do me a favor. I really want to hear from 
ANY Loudoun citizen on ANY issues, request, criticism, compliment, or just your thoughts. .... I 
really try to keep back and forth conversations ... on my county Facebook page..."46 Although 
she sought to use this Facebook page as a platform for interacting with her constituents, Randall 
apparently chose to set up the page outside of the County’s official channels so that she would 
not be constrained by the policies applicable to County social media websites.47  Many of the 
posts on her Facebook page involve Randall's work as Chair of the Loudoun County Board of 
Supervisors and are specifically addressed to her constituency.48 
 In February 2016, Randall participated in a (real space) town hall discussion hosted by 
the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors and the Loudoun County School Board.49  Brian 
Davison, a constituent and critic of Randall, attended the panel discussion and anonymously 
submitted two questions for discussion during the town hall, one of which was selected for 
submission to the panel, which concerned Randall's proposal for an ethics pledge for public 
servants.50 In his question, Davison asked whether School Board members – who Davison 
believed had acted unethically – should be required to take such an ethics pledge.51 Randall 
answered the question at the town hall, which she characterized as a "set-up question, " but                                                         
44 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 227 F. Supp. 3d 605, 610-11 (2017). 
45 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 708. 
46 Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at708. 
47 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at707. 
48 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at709-10 (“Many - perhaps most - of the posts . . . are expressly 
addressed to “Loudoun” - Defendant’s constituents.”). 
49 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at710. 
50 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at710. 
51 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 710. 
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Davison found her answer to be inadequate.  After Randall responded to his question during the 
town hall, Davison tweeted a message at Randall, which read: “@ChairRandall ‘set up 
question’? You might want to strictly follow FOIA [the Freedom of Information Act] and the 
COIA [the Conflicts of Interest Act] as well.”52 Later that evening, Randall posted about the 
panel discussion on her Facebook page.53  Davison, persistent in his criticisms of Randall, posted 
a related comment on Randall’s Facebook page, in which he continued to advance allegations of 
corruption on the part of Loudoun County's School Board and alleged conflicts of interest on the 
part of School Board members.54  
 Randall took issue with Davison's comments on her Facebook page regarding Loudoun 
County School Board members and chose to delete her original post about the panel discussion 
and Davison's comment as well.55  Randall also chose to ban Davison from her Facebook page.56 
As a consequence of being banned from Randall's Facebook page, Davison could not comment 
on Randall's posts in a manner that was accessible by all of Randall's constituents who followed 
her on that page, nor could he send messages to Randall via her Facebook page.57 
C. President Donald Trump Blocks Individuals from Following his Twitter Account 
 
 President Donald Trump makes extensive use of Twitter and, in particular, of his Twitter 
account @realDonaldTrump.58 Although Trump and his administration also make use of other 
                                                        
52 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 710. 
53 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 710. 
54 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711. 
55 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711. 
56 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711. 
57 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711. Davison could, however, still read content posted on Randall's 
Facebook page, since it was available to the general public. Id. The following morning, however, Randall 
reconsidered her decision to ban Davison from her Facebook page and unbanned him. Id. Accordingly, 
Davison was only banned from Randall's website for approximately a 12 hour period, at most. Id. 
58 See e.g., Donald J. Trump, Twitter Counter, https://twittercounter.com/realDonaldTrump (last updated 
July 14, 2018); Amanda Wills & Alysha Love, All the President's Tweets, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/politics/trump-tweets (last updated July 14, 2018). 
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Twitter accounts -- including @POTUS and @WhiteHouse -- Trump primarily communicates to 
the public via his @realDonaldTrump [@RDT] Twitter account.59  (Indeed, both the 
@WhiteHouse account and the @POTUS account indicate that people should follow these 
accounts "for the latest from President @realDonaldTrump and his Administration," suggesting 
that the @RDT account is the primary source of communications relating to the Trump 
Administration.60  Although Trump established the @RDT account in 2009 prior to being 
elected president, Trump now uses this account as his primary channel for communicating with 
the public about matters related to his administration and his presidency.61 Prior to being elected 
president, Trump used his @RDT account to tweet about a variety of topics -- like golf, popular 
culture, and politics.62 However, since his inauguration in January 2017, Trump has used the 
@RDT predominantly to communicate about matters related to his presidency and his 
administration.63  In addition, Trump has set up his @RDT account in a manner that indicates 
                                                        
59 See e.g., Mike Snider, Is Trump's Blocking of Some 
Twitter Users Unconstitutional?, USA TODAY (June 6, 2017, 3:26 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/06/06/trumps-blocking-some-twitter-users-
unconstitutional/102549854 (describing the President's use of the @RDT account as “unprecedented”). 
60 The While House (@WhiteHouse), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/WhiteHouse. See President Trump 
(@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/potus(linking to the @RDT account in the account 
description).  
61 See Robert Loeb, Blocking Twitter Users From the Presidential Account, LAWFARE (June 13, 2017, 
5:31 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/blocking-twitter-users-presidential-account-0 (“The President . . 
.  uses his @realDonaldTrump account to speak to matters as President of the United States. He speaks to 
acts of foreign countries, court decisions, legislative proposals, posts video of cabinet meetings, and 
expresses his views as President on a host of public policy issues. . . This is not merely a personal social 
media account where Mr. Trump posts birthday greetings to friends and family.”). 
62 See e.g., Monica Sisavat, Here Are Those Tweets Donald Trump Wrote About Kristen Stewart and 
Robert Pattinson, POPSUGAR (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.popsugar.com/celebrity/Donald-Trump-2012-
Tweets-About-Kristen-Stewart-43112386 (tracking a series of @RDT tweets of Trump commenting on 
Twilight star Kristen Stewart and her relationship with co-star Robert Pattinson). 
63 See Alex Abdo, @realDonaldTrump and the First Amendment, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE 
AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (June 19, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/news/realdonaldtrump-and-first-
amendment (“The President uses the [@RDT] account almost exclusively to communicate about 
government affairs, including international affairs, economic policy, and appointments to senior 
government positions. This is not an account focused on personal interests, say, television, golf courses, 
or family.”). 
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that it is the official account associated with his presidency.  The account is registered to Donald 
Trump, "45th President of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.," and the header 
pictures associated with the account show images of President Trump performing his official 
duties.64    
 President Trump tweets frequently from his @RDT account to make announcements and 
to engage in advocacy efforts related to his administration and his presidency.  Notably, Trump 
uses his @RDT account far more frequently than he uses the @POTUS account or the 
@WhiteHouse to communicate with the public.65 His then-Press Secretary Sean Spicer stated 
that tweets from President Trump should be understood as "official statements by the President 
of the United States"66 and his social media director Dan Scavino has indicated that all three 
Twitter accounts associated with his presidency -- @realDonaldTrump, @POTUS, and 
@WhiteHouse -- are channels through which "President Donald J. Trump . . . communicates 
with you, the American people!"67  Trump has used his @realDonalTrump account on a daily 
basis for a variety of official governmental purposes: “to announce, describe, and defend his 
policies; to promote his Administration’s legislative agenda; to announce official decisions; to 
engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize state visits; to challenge media organizations 
whose coverage of his Administration he believes to be unfair” (among other purposes).68  For 
                                                        
64 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump 
65 As of this writing, the @RDT account has about 38,000 tweets, while the @POTUS account has about 
3,000 tweets and the @WhiteHouse account has about 4,500 tweets. Compare Donald J. Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump, with President Trump 
(@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/potus, and The White House (@WhiteHouse), TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/WhiteHouse. 
66 See Ali Vitali, Trump's Tweets 'Official Statements,' Spicer Says, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2017, 5:02 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-s-tweets-official-statements-spicer-says-n768931.  
67 Dan Scavino Jr. (@Savino45), TWITTER (June 6, 2017, 3:39 PM), 
https://twitter.com/scavino45/status/872221311090778114?lang=en. 
68 Complaint at 14, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) 
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example, Trump used this account to announce his intention to nominate Christopher Wray for 
the position of FBI director,69 to remove then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson from his 
position,70 and to remove then-Secretary of Veterans Affairs David Shulkin from his position.71  
Trump also used his @RDT account as a vehicle to announce that the United States Government 
would no longer accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in the military.72  Federal courts 
regard tweets from @RDT as official statements by and from the president.  For example, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited the president's tweets from his @RDT account 
in striking down Executive Order 13,780, which temporarily suspended nationals of certain 
                                                        
69 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 7, 2017, 4:44 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/872419018799550464?lang=en (tweeting, “I will be 
nominating Christopher A. Wray, a man of impeccable credentials, to be the new Director of the FBI. 
Details to follow”).  
70 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 2018 5:44 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/973540316656623616?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E973540316656623616&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fmashable.com%2F201
8%2F03%2F13%2Frex-tillerson-fired-twitter%2F (tweeting, “Mike Pompeo, Director of the CIA, will 
become our new Secretary of State. He will do a fantastic job! Thank you to Rex Tillerson for his 
service!”). 
71 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 28, 2018, 2:31 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/979108653377703936?lang=en (tweeting, “I am pleased to 
announce that I intend to nominate highly respected Admiral Ronny L. Jackson, MD, as the new 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs….”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 28, 2018, 
2:31 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/979108846408003584 (tweeting, “....In the 
interim, Hon. Robert Wilkie of DOD will serve as Acting Secretary. I am thankful to Dr. Shulkin’s 
service to our country and to our GREAT VETERANS!”). 
72 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E890193981585444864&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theatlantic.com%
2Fpolitics%2Farchive%2F2017%2F11%2Fpricking-of-his-thumbs%2F544547%2F (tweeting, “After 
consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States Government 
will not accept or allow……”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04 
AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E890196164313833472&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theatlantic.com%
2Fpolitics%2Farchive%2F2017%2F11%2Fpricking-of-his-thumbs%2F544547%2F (tweeting, 
“....Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.”). 
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countries from entering the United States.73 In addition, the United States Supreme Court 
recently referenced the president’s tweets in its 5-4 decision upholding the revised Muslim travel 
ban.74  
Trump's @RDT Twitter account is generally accessible and open to the public, without 
regard to political affiliation, ideological position, or viewpoint.75  As of this date, the account 
has approximately 53 million followers and President Trump has not (generally) limited who can 
access to his account or what people can say in response to his tweets.76  Trump's tweets from 
the @RDT account generally attract a large number of comments from those who follow the 
account on Twitter.77 Followers are able to interact with and engage with the president's tweets 
in a number of ways. First, followers can view the president's tweets (as can anyone with access 
to Twitter). Second, followers of @RDT can retweet his tweets. Third, followers can "like" his 
tweets. Fourth, and most significantly for purposes of this Article, followers can reply to his 
tweets.78   The president's tweets from @RDT generally garner a substantial amount of 
                                                        
73 See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 773 n.14 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Donald J. Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (June 5, 2017, 6:20 PM, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/871899511525961728). 
74 In Trump v. Hawaii, both the majority and the dissent refer to Trump’s tweets regarding the Muslim 
ban in analyzing the constitutionality of the Executive Order at issue.  138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417, 2437-3 
(2018). See also Brian Fung, The Supreme Court's Travel Ban Ruling Could Have Big Implications For 
Trump's Twitter Account, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/06/26/supreme-courts-travel-ban-ruling-could-have-
big-implications-trumps-twitter-account/?utm_term=.07adab122704 (“Both in the opinion and the 
dissents, the Justices consistently adopted the perspective that Trump’s broadcasts on Twitter are an 
official reflection of the White House -- not merely the personal feelings of a private individual, as the 
government has claimed elsewhere.”). 
75 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump. 
76 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump. 
77 See also Ashley Hoffman, President's Trump's Top Tweets of All Time Show a Stark Divide, TIME 
(Apr. 28, 2017), http://time.com/4758366/trump-most-popular-tweets-ever (tracking Trump’s most 
popular tweets). 
78 See e.g., Charlie Warzel, Inside the Chaotic Battle to be the Top Reply to a Trump Tweet, BUZZFEED 
(June 9, 2017, 1:31 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/charliewarzel/trollpotusgrowthhack?utm_term=.eoV5gYveO#.nivZP6gko 
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engagement from members of the public, with typical responses including tens of thousands of 
replies.79  For example, within the three hour period after Trump tweeted his ban on transgender 
individuals in the military, the three tweets announcing the change in policy had been retweeted 
approximately 121,000 times, liked 382,000 times, and replied to 142,000 times.80 Replies to 
tweets on Twitter are iterative, and include replies to an initial tweet, as well as replies to replies.  
This interactive and iterative thread of commentary related to a particular tweet is referred to as 
the "comment thread," which includes multiple overlapping comments and responses among 
Twitter users.  Each tweet from the president's @RDT account engenders an extensive 
interactive response from members of the public who follow the president’s account on Twitter, 
with thousands of retweets, likes, and replies composing an extensive and detailed iterative 
comment thread.81 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(“Most importantly, the top reply to a Trump tweet is guaranteed to get in front of hundreds of thousands 
of eyes.”). 
79 E.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 31, 2016, 5:17 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/815185071317676033?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E815185071317676033&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Ftime.com%2F4758366
%2Ftrump-most-popular-tweets-ever%2F (garnering over 131,000 retweets, over 332,000 likes, and over 
76,000 comments on his tweet wishing a happy new year "to my many enemies and those who have 
fought me and lost so badly they just don't know what to do"). 
80 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E890193981585444864&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theatlantic.com%
2Fpolitics%2Farchive%2F2017%2F11%2Fpricking-of-his-thumbs%2F544547%2F (retweeted over 
39,600 times; liked over 119,110 times; and replied to over 25,000 times); Donald J. Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E890196164313833472&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theatlantic.com%
2Fpolitics%2Farchive%2F2017%2F11%2Fpricking-of-his-thumbs%2F544547%2F (retweeted over 
41,700 times; liked over 129,300 times; and replied to over 45,000 times); Donald J. Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:08 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890197095151546369?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E890197095151546369&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F201
7%2F07%2F26%2Fpolitics%2Ftrump-military-transgender%2Findex.html (retweeted over 39,700 times; 
liked over 133,700 times; and replied to over 72,000 times). 
81 See e.g., Warzel, supra note X (describing the “race” of followers to reply to a Trump tweet because of 
the increase in followers those replying experience with their own Twitter accounts). 
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 Among the 53 million individuals who follow Trump on his @RDT Twitter account, 
several of them have responded to his tweets in a manner that was critical or questioning of the 
president. Several individuals who followed @RDT and who tweeted replies that were critical or 
questioning of the president or his policies were blocked from following his Twitter account 
shortly after they posted their critical questions or replies.82  One such individual, Joseph Papp, is 
a former professional road cyclist and current anti-doping advocate.83 Prior to being blocked, Mr. 
Papp was active in following and engaging with Trump's tweets on @RDT, posting replies that 
appeared in Trump's comment threads and were accessible by the millions who follow Trump on 
@RDT.84  Mr. Papp's replies had also been quoted in media articles describing citizen responses 
to Trump.85  On June 3, 2017, President Trump tweeted a video of his weekly presidential 
address.86 A few minutes later, Mr. Papp replied to this tweet with a pair of linked tweets that 
said "Greetings from Pittsburgh, Sir," and "Why didn't you attend your #PittsburghNotParis rally 
in DC, Sir?"87 The next day, on June 4, 2017, Mr. Papp learned that he had been blocked from 
following President Trump on his @RDT account.88   
 Another such individual who was blocked from following Trump on his @RDT account 
is Rebecca Buckwalter, a writer and political analyst whose articles have been published by                                                         
82 See e.g., Ashley Feinberg, A Running List of People Donald Trump Has Blocked on Twitter, WIRED 
(June 14, 2017, 3:38 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/donald-trump-twitter-blocked (tracking the 
Twitter users blocked by Trump). 
83 See Complaint at 22, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
84 See Exhibit H to Joint Stipulation of Facts, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 
302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
85 See Complaint at 22, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
86 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 3, 2017, 12:53 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/871087981225926656.  
87 See Joe Papp (@joepabike), TWITTER (June 3, 2017, 12:36 PM), 
https://twitter.com/joepabike/status/871088288202928128; Joe Papp (@joepabike), TWITTER (June 3, 
2017, 12:39 PM), https://twitter.com/joepabike/status/871089057098551296.  
88 See Complaint at 22, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
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media outlets such as The Atlantic, National Public Radio, and CNN.89  Ms. Buckwalter had 
been active in following Trump on his @RDT account and frequently replying to Trump's 
tweets, such that her replies appeared in Trump's comment threads and were accessible by the 
millions who follow Trump on his @RDT account.90  On June 6, 2017, President Trump tweeted 
"Sorry folks, but if I would have relied on the Fake News of CNN, NBC, ABC, CBS washpost or 
nytimes, I would have had ZERO chance of winning WH."91 In response to this tweet, 
Buckwalter replied, "To be fair you didn't win the WH: Russia won it for you."92 Buckwalter's 
reply tweet in the @RDT comment thread, in turn, received over nine thousand likes and over 
three thousand retweets.93  Shortly thereafter, Buckwalter learned that she was blocked from the 
president's @RDT account.94    
 Brandon Neely was another avid follower of Trump on his @RDT account who engaged 
frequently with Trump and his followers via the @RDT account.95 Neely is a police officer and 
Iraq War Veteran with a Twitter account followed by approximately 10,200 people.96  When 
Neely replied to and commented on the president's tweets from @RDT, Neely's comments 
                                                        
89 See Complaint at 17, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
90 See Exhibit C to Joint Stipulation of Facts, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 
302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
91 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 6, 2017, 5:15 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/872064426568036353?lang=en.  
92 RPBP (@rpbp), TWITTER (June 6, 2017, 5:16 AM), https://twitter.com/rpbp/status/8720647230843330. 
93 See RPBP (@rpbp), TWITTER (June 6, 2017, 5:16 AM), 
https://twitter.com/rpbp/status/8720647230843330.  
94 See Complaint at 17, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
95 See Exhibit G to Joint Stipulation of Facts, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 
302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) (listing tweets and replies from Brandon 
Neely’s Twitter, @BrandonTXNeely). 
96 See Complaint at 21, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205); Brandon Neely (@BrandonTXNeely), TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/BrandonTXNeely?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
.  
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frequently appeared at the top of the comment threads associated with @RDT.97  On June 12, 
2017, President Trump tweeted "Congratulations! First new Coal Mine of Trump Era Opens in 
Pennsylvania," and included a link to a Fox News article about the mine's opening.98  In response 
to the president's tweet, Mr. Neely replied, "Congrats and now black lung won't be covered under 
#TrumpCare."99  Mr. Neely's reply tweet drew a fair amount of attention, receiving 3,181 likes 
and 338 retweets.100  The next day, on June 13, 2017, Mr. Neely learned that he had been 
blocked from following the president on his @RDT account.   Several other followers of 
Trump's @RDT Twitter account were blocked after making similar critical comments or posing 
critical questions to Trump as replies to his tweets.101 
                                                        
97 See Complaint at 21, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
98 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 12, 2017, 10:59 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/874325287143604224?lang=en.  
99 Brandon Neely (@BrandonTXNeely), TWITTER (June 12, 2017, 11:00 AM), 
https://twitter.com/BrandonTXNeely/status/874325611334029313.  
100 See Brandon Neely (@BrandonTXNeely), TWITTER (June 12, 2017, 11:00 AM), 
https://twitter.com/BrandonTXNeely/status/874325611334029313.  
101 Four other individuals joined Buckwalter, Papp, and Neely, in a suit brought by the Knight First 
Amendment Institute at Columbia University, to challenge the president's act of blocking them from 
following his @RDT account, after these individuals were blocked for posting similar types of questions 
and comments in response to tweets from the president on his @RDT account.  See Complaint at 3-4, 
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 
1:17 Civ. 05205). Philip Cohen, a sociology professor at University of Maryland College Park and avid 
follower of the president’s @RDT Twitter account, was blocked after posting a critical response to a 
Trump tweet. See Complaint at 18, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. 
Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). See also Exhibit D to Joint Stipulation of Facts, 
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 
1:17 Civ. 05205) (listing tweets and replies from Philip Cohen’s Twitter, @familyunequal).  On June 6, 
2017, Trump tweeted "#ICYMI [In Case You Missed It] Announcement of Air Traffic Control 
Initiative...Watch," which provided a link to an announcement of an Air Traffic Control Initiative. Donald 
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 6, 2017, 5:44 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/872253002266161153?lang=en. Professor Cohen tweeted a 
reply showing a picture of the president with the words "Corrupt Incompetent Authoritarian. And then 
there are the policies. Resist." Philip N Cohen (@familyunequal), TWITTER (June 6, 2017, 5:45 PM), 
https://twitter.com/familyunequal/status/872253179915841536. Professor Cohen’s reply tweet received 
over 300 likes and 35 retweets. See Complaint at 18, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. 
Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). Shortly after Professor Cohen 
tweeted his reply, he was blocked from following the president on his @RDT account. See Complaint at 
18, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
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(No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). Holly Figueroa, a national political organizer and songwriter, was an avid follower 
of the president on his @RDT account. See Complaint at 19 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). See also Exhibit E to Joint 
Stipulation of Facts, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) (listing tweets and replies from Holly Figueroa’s Twitter, 
@AynRandPaulRyan). Many of her replies to the president’s tweets garnered thousands of responses in 
the form of likes and retweets and appeared at or near the top of the president’s comment threads.  See 
Complaint at 19, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). On May 28, 2017, the president addressed the terrorist attack in 
Manchester, England, by tweeting “British Prime Minister May was very angry that the info the U.K. 
gave to the U.S. about Manchester was leaked. Gave me full details!” Donald J. Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 28, 2017, 7:43 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/868840252227674113?lang=en. In response to the president’s 
tweet, Ms. Figueroa replied with a tweet (which in turn received 15,000 likes) containing a picture of the 
Pope looking incredulously at the president, along with the tweet “This is pretty much how the whole 
world sees you.” Holly Figueroa O'Reilly BWCS (@AynRyanPaulRyan), TWITTER (May 28, 2017, 7:53 
AM), 
https://twitter.com/AynRandPaulRyan/status/868842669069422592?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%
5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E868842669069422592&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnbc.com%2F2
018%2F05%2F23%2Fread-the-tweets-that-got-these-people-blocked-on-twitter-by-president-donald-
trump.html. Hours later, Ms. Figueroa learned that she was blocked from following the president on his 
@RDT Twitter account. See Complaint at 19, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 
302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). Eugene Gu, a resident in general surgery, 
was an avid follower of the president’s @RDT Twitter account, with some of his replies to 
@realDonaldTrump receiving thousands of likes and appearing on “Twitter Moments” (Twitter’s 
encapsulation of current events that incorporate particularly popular tweets).  See Complaint at 20, Knight 
First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 
05205). See also source Exhibit F to Joint Stipulation of Facts, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) (listing tweets and replies 
from Eugene Gu’s Twitter, @eugenegu). On June 28, 2017 at 4:02 am, the president tweeted “The new 
Rasmussen Poll, one of the most accurate in the 2016 Election, just out with a Trump 50% Approval 
Rating. That’s higher than O’s #’s!”  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 18, 2017, 
4:02 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/876394578777174021?lang=en. In response to the 
president’s tweet, Mr. Gu replied “Covfefe: The same guy who doesn’t proofread his Twitter handles the 
nuclear button” (in which Mr. Gu referred to the president’s unexplained tweet from May 31, 2017, which 
read in full: “Despite the constant negative press covfefe.”) Eugene Gu, MD (@eugenegu), TWITTER 
(June 18, 2017, 4:12 AM), https://twitter.com/eugenegu/status/876397178780078081. See also Matt 
Flegenheimer, What's a 'Covfefe'? Trump Tweet Unites a Bewildered Nation, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/us/politics/covfefe-trump-twitter.html. Mr. Gu’s reply tweet 
received 2,900 likes and 239 retweets. See Eugene Gu, MD (@eugenegu), TWITTER (June 18, 2017, 4:12 
AM), https://twitter.com/eugenegu/status/876397178780078081. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Gu learned that 
he had been blocked from following the president on his @RDT Twitter account. See Complaint at 20, 
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 
1:17 Civ. 05205). Nick Pappas, a comic and writer, was an avid follower of the president’s @RDT 
Twitter account, and his replies to the president often received thousands of likes and retweets. See 
Complaint at 22, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). See also Exhibit I to Joint Stipulation of Facts, Knight First 
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 
05205) (listing tweets and replies from Nick Pappas’s Twitter, @Pappiness). On June 5, 2017, the 
president tweeted “The Justice Dept. should ask for an expedited hearing of the watered down Travel Ban 
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 As a result of being blocked from following Trump's @RDT account, these blocked 
individuals were no longer able to interact or engage with the president's tweets on his extensive 
Twitter platform or to participate and engage in the wide-ranging policy discussions that the 
president's tweets engender.102  Specifically, individuals blocked from following the president's 
@RDT Twitter account cannot view tweets from @RDT on the Twitter platform, cannot reply to 
these tweets, and cannot reply to replies on these tweets.103 In addition, the blocked individuals’ 
tweets replying to the president's tweets are not viewable by the millions of Americans who 
follow the president on his @RDT account.104 As such, blocked individuals are prohibited from 
meaningfully engaging and interacting with the president's tweets on his Twitter platform of 
choice, which is his chosen and preferred means of engaging with his constituents, the American 
people.105                                                                                                                                                                                     
before the Supreme Court - & seek much tougher version!” and “In any event we are EXTREME 
VETTING people coming into the U.S. in order to keep our country safe.  The courts are slow and 
political!” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 3:37 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/871677472202477568?lang=en; Donald J. Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 3:44 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/871679061847879682?lang=en. In response to the president’s 
tweets, Mr. Pappas replied, “Trump is right. The government should protect the people.  That’s why the 
courts are protecting us from him.” Nick Jack Pappas (@Pappiness), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 3:50 AM), 
https://twitter.com/Pappiness/status/871680720707747840. This tweet received 395 retweets and 1,181 
likes. See Complaint at 23, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 
541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). Within a few hours of replying to the president, Mr. Pappas 
learned that he was blocked from following the president on his @RDT Twitter account. See Complaint 
at 23, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
102 See How to Block Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-
twitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts (last visited July 15, 2018) (listing the actions that a blocked 
account cannot take). 
103 See Cross-Motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 14, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 
541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
104 See How to Block Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-
twitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts (last visited July 15, 2018) (advising users that “[t]weets from 
blocked accounts will not appear in your timeline”). 
105 See e.g., Nicholas Carr, Why Trump Tweets (And Why We Listen), POLITICO (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/26/donald-trump-twitter-addiction-216530 (analyzing 
Trump’s “fixation” with Twitter). 
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D. Lawsuits Challenging Government Officials' Blocking of Users from Social Media Forums 
 In each of the cases described above, citizens who were blocked by government officials 
from engaging with them on the officials' social media forums brought suit, claiming that their 
First Amendment rights had been violated.  The Maryland citizens claimed, in their suit against 
Governor Hogan, that the comment space on Governor Hogan's Facebook page constituted a 
public forum for speech and that the Social Media Policy under which Hogan blocked citizens 
who questioned or criticized his policies constituted illegal viewpoint discrimination within a 
public forum.106  Similarly, Virginia citizen Brian Davison claimed, in his suit against the 
Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, that the comment space on Commissioner Randall's 
Facebook page constituted a public forum for speech and that the blocking of Davison based on 
his critical comments about Randall constituted illegal viewpoint discrimination within that 
public forum.107 And the seven Twitter users who were blocked from accessing President 
Trump's @RDT Twitter account also claimed that the interactive space on Trump's account 
constituted a public forum from which they were unconstitutionally blocked based on their 
viewpoints.108 In each case, the government officials responded by asserting that the forums at 
issue were not properly considered public forums under the First Amendment public forum 
doctrine.109 Instead, they assert that they were operating these accounts in their personal capacity 
                                                        
106 See Complaint at 3, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017) 
(alleging that Governor Hogan, through the social media policy “engag[ed] in unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a broader public debate”). 
107 See Complaint at 7, Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. May 
10, 2017). 
108 See Complaint at 2-3, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).. 
109 See Hogan Answer; Defendants Loudoun County Board of Supervisors and Phyllis Randall's 
Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment Filed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) at 14, 
Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, (E.D. Va.  2017) (No. 1:16 Civ. 
00932); Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 11, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
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not in their official government capacity, and that they therefore enjoy the First Amendment 
right to delete comments and/or block individuals from these forums.110  In the alternative, they 
argue that if these sites are viewed as governmental, their speech constitutes "government 
speech," which is immune from scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.111  Before analyzing 
these cases in greater detail, below I examine the historical development, evolution, and 
importance of the public forum doctrine in American First Amendment jurisprudence, as well as 
the recently developed government speech doctrine, under which government expression is 
immune from scrutiny under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.  
II. The Development and Evolution of the Public Forum Doctrine  
A. Introduction 
The public forum doctrine mandates that the government facilitate speech by requiring 
that certain forums be made or held available for uncensored discussion, debate, and exercise of 
other First Amendment freedoms.112  This doctrine, which grows out of the 1939 case of Hague 
v. CIO,113 imposes obligations on the government to facilitate speech without discrimination on 
the basis of viewpoint within places that are traditionally devoted to or are well-suited to the 
exercise of such freedoms -- such as public parks, sidewalks and streets -- as well as within                                                         
110 See Hogan Answer; Defendants Loudoun County Board of Supervisors and Phyllis Randall's 
Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment Filed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) at 14, 
Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, (E.D. Va.  2017) (No. 1:16 Civ. 
00932) (challenging the assertion that Randall’s Facebook page is a public forum because it “was created 
and controlled by her personally and is not subject to control or administration by the County or subject t 
its social media policy”); Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 11, Knight First Amendment 
Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) 
(classifying Trump’s Twitter use as an official’s “routine[] engage[ment] in personal conduct that is not 
an exercise of state power”). 
111 See Hogan Answer; Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 15, Knight First Amendment 
Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
112 See e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“In places which 
by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State 
to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”). 
113 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 494 (1939). 
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places that the government has chosen to open up for expressive purposes, whether those places 
are government-owned or privately-owned but government-controlled.114 
 Since the Supreme Court’s adoption of the public forum doctrine in the mid-twentieth 
century, the state and "state actors"115 have been constitutionally required to facilitate and to 
refrain from suppressing speech on the basis of viewpoint within such forums.116  Under the 
public forum doctrine, the government is held to exacting standards regarding its ability to 
restrict speech within such forums.117  The existence of public forums like public sidewalks, 
streets, and parks advances free speech values by providing forums for individuals to 
communicate with and reach out to broad general audiences as well as to particularly relevant 
specific audiences.118 The Supreme Court has recognized that the availability of such forums in 
which individuals are ensured the meaningful right and opportunity to express themselves has 
been central to freedom of expression and to democratic self-government “from time 
immemorial.”119 Because of the important function that such public places serve in facilitating 
the exchange of ideas and expression in democracies, the public forum doctrine imposes upon 
the government the obligation to preserve and protect such places for free expression.120 
                                                        
114 See, e.g., Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1735 (“A basic rule, for example, is that a street or park is a 
quintessential forum for the exercise of First Amendment rights); source 66 at 555 (holding a private 
theater leased by the government as a public forum). 
115 See text accompanying notes x-y. 
116
 See Rosenberger v. Rector Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (explaining that the 
State is forbidden from “exercising viewpoint discrimination, even when the limited public forum is one 
of its own creation”). 
117 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (“The government must abstain from regulating speech when the 
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the 
restriction.”). 
118
 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515. 
119 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 513 (protecting the right to peaceably petition the government as “an attribute 
of national citizenship”). 
120
 See Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1735 (identifying public forums as “essential venues for public 
gatherings to celebrate some views, to protest others, or simply to learn and inquire”).  
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 The Supreme Court championed the values served by the public forum in what is known 
as its first public forum case, Hague v. CIO.121 This case arose out of a dispute between members 
of the Committee for Industrial Organization (now part of the AFL-CIO) and Jersey City, New 
Jersey, which was hostile to the message that the CIO sought to communicate.122  Members of 
the CIO sought to conduct informational outreach in various public venues in Jersey City to 
explain to City workers the purposes and benefits of the National Labor Relations Act and to 
distribute pamphlets on the subject.123 CIO members repeatedly sought from the City -- and were 
repeatedly denied -- permission to lease the city hall to conduct public meetings and/or distribute 
their pamphlets in city streets and other similar public places.124  When CIO members continued 
attempting to express their message in these public places, the mayor ordered them arrested and 
literally ferried out of the City on boats bound for New York.125   
In response to the CIO’s claim that the City violated its First Amendment rights, the City 
argued that its right to exclude people from City property was as absolute as that of a private 
property owner to exclude people from his or her home, and that the City therefore enjoyed the 
power to exclude whichever citizens it chose for whatever reasons it chose from City property.126 
The CIO contended that the City was chargeable with different duties than those of a private 
owner of property – duties to facilitate the expression of members of the public on matters of 
public importance.127 The Supreme Court agreed.128  In ushering in the modern public forum 
doctrine, the Court explained that the existence and flourishing of our form of democratic self-
                                                        
121 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
122
 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 501. 
123
 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 501-02. 
124
 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 502-03. 
125
 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 502. 
126
 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 514. 
127
 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 514-16. 
128
 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 514-16. 
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government require that citizens enjoy meaningful opportunities to express themselves and 
meaningful venues in which to do so:  
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the 
part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public 
affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. . . . Citizenship of the 
United States would be little better than a name if it did not carry with it 
the right to discuss national legislation and the benefits, advantages, and 
opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom.129 
 
The Court rejected Jersey City’s claim that its right to exclude was as absolute as that of a private 
property owner and adopted what is now known as the public forum doctrine, in which the 
government is charged with the obligation to facilitate speech without discrimination on certain 
types of property: 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public, and time out of mind, have 
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.  Such use of the streets and 
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, 
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.  The privilege of a citizen of 
the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views 
on national questions . . . must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged 
or denied.130 
 
 Accordingly, in Hague v. CIO, the Court imposed on government actors the obligation 
not to discriminate against, and to accord the widest possible latitude to, speech within property 
like streets and parks that has “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public … for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”131 Within these “traditional public forums,” individuals are guaranteed not just the 
right in theory but also the meaningful opportunity in practice to express themselves.  
 Eight months after the Hague decision, the Supreme Court solidified its newly-articulated                                                         
129 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 513 (internal quotations omitted). 
130 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16. 
131
 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515. 
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public forum doctrine in the case of Schneider v. State.132  In Schneider, individuals who had 
handed out leaflets on a public street announcing a protest were convicted of violating an 
ordinance prohibiting the distribution of leaflets on public streets.133  The municipality defended 
the ordinance on the grounds that it was designed to prevent littering and that there were other 
venues available to the speakers to disseminate their message.134 Rejecting the municipality’s 
argument, the Court explained that the government has an obligation to facilitate speech within 
places that are well-suited to such expression.135  Justice Roberts wrote:  
The streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of 
information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty 
of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be 
exercised in some other place.136 
 
 In both Hague and Schneider, the Supreme Court underscored the importance that the 
unrestricted, uncensored free flow of information serves in our system of democratic self-
government. Because the right to engage in such speech is “so vital to the maintenance of 
democratic institutions” and is implied within “the very idea of government, republic in form,” 
the government is not permitted to restrict the exercise of free speech on such property.137 
 Not all public property enjoys public forum status, however.  Property such as 
government-owned office buildings, state prisons, and places that are not held open by the 
government or traditionally used for expressive purposes are not considered public forums in 
                                                        
132 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). 
133
 See Schneider, 308 U.S at 155. 
134
 See Schneider, 308 U.S at 155-56. 
135
 See Schneider, 308 U.S at 160 (“Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep 
their communities’ streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose 
to which the streets are dedicated.”). 
136 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160  (emphasis added). 
137
 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161; Hague, 307 U.S. at 513. 
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which the state is obligated to facilitate citizens’ free speech rights.138  But, within government-
owned property that has traditionally been available for expressive purposes -- like public parks, 
streets, sidewalks -- or property that the government has made available for expressive purposes, 
all speakers are permitted to express themselves.139  It is within these public forums that citizens 
enjoy the fullest and most meaningful protection of their right to free expression.140  The 
government is required to permit speech within such forums141– regardless of the content of such 
speech or the viewpoint of the speaker – and any restrictions on speech within such forums are 
subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny.142 The mandate that the government preserve forums for 
the nondiscriminatory exercise of the right of free speech provides a crucial safeguard for free 
expression. Speakers can enter traditional public forums like public parks, streets, and sidewalks, 
and express themselves with the assurance that their speech cannot be censored by the forum 
owner on the basis of viewpoint or subject matter.143  
After its initial inception in the mid-twentieth century, the development of the public 
forum doctrine became more complex.  Recent Supreme Court cases have broken out public 
forums into the following categories144: (1) traditional public forums; (2) designated public                                                         
138 In particular, authoritarian government forums, like prisons, military bases, and schools, are generally 
considered non-public forums.  See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966) (county jail not a 
public forum); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (military base not a public forum). 
139 See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (recognizing traditional public fora as “places which by long 
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate”). As I explain infra, within a 
designated public forum devoted to particular subjects, however, the government may impose restrictions 
limiting expression to the particular subject matter(s) for which the forum is designated.  See text 
accompanying notes x-y. 
140
 See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (describing the State’s right to limit expressive activity in 
traditional public fora as “sharply circumscribed”). 
141 See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (1983). 
142 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (requiring “exacting scrutiny” for “facially 
content-based restriction[s] on political speech in a public forum”). 
143
 See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (prohibiting states from “prohibit[ing] all communicative 
activity”). 
144 In Perry, the Court provided an especially clear overview of its recent public forum jurisprudence, 
explaining: 
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forums (both of general purpose and limited purpose); and (3) nonpublic forums.145  
“Traditional” public forums consist of streets, sidewalks, and parks and other places that “have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used 
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discerning public 
questions.”146 The Court has recently made clear that this category is limited to streets, 
sidewalks, and parks and will not readily be expanded.147 “Designated public forums” consist of 
government-owned or government-controlled property that has not “immemorially” been used 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
At one end of the spectrum are streets and parks, which have immemorially been held in trust for 
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.... In these [traditional 
public forums or] quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all 
communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion, it must show that its 
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end. ... The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of 
expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government 
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. ... A second category 
[designated public forums] consists of public property which the State has opened for use by the 
public as a place for expressive activity. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain 
exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to create the 
forum in the first place.  Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character 
of the facility, as long as it does so, it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional 
public forum. Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-
based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest....  Public 
property which is not, by tradition or designation, a forum for public communication [nonpublic 
forums] is governed by different standards. ... In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, 
the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as 
the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because 
public officials oppose the speaker's view. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46. 
 
145 The category of nonpublic forums includes places like military bases, jail grounds, and federal 
workplaces, that the government owns but which it has not opened up for expressive activity on the part 
of the public. See e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46-47 (classifying a school mail facility as a 
nonpublic forum). 
146 Hague, 307 U.S. at 515. 
147 See, e.g., Arkansas Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U. S. 666 , 679 (1998) (explaining that 
“[t]he Court has rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic 
confines.”) Recent cases have also made clear that not all expressive activity within a public street, 
sidewalk, or park will be treated the same under the public forum doctrine. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City 
v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), discussed infra. Rather, the Court will consider the nature and the type 
of access sought within the forum at issue.  See text accompanying notes x - y. 
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for expressive purposes but which the government has opened up and designated as a place for 
public expressive activity.148  The government may choose, for example, to open up property 
within a public school,149 public university meeting facilities,150 or privately-owned municipal 
theaters leased by the government151 as forums for expression generally or for expression on 
certain designated subjects.  Within a general-purpose designated public forum, the government 
is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of the content, subject matter, or viewpoint of the 
speech at issue.152 Within a limited-purpose designated public forum (also known as a “limited 
public forum”), once the government has defined the subject matter limitations of the forum (for 
example, by limiting the forum to speech on social, civic, and recreational topics153), the 
government may restrict the forum to speech that concerns those subjects, but beyond such 
permissible subject-matter restrictions, regulation is subject to the same stringent limitations as 
those governing a traditional public forum, and viewpoint discrimination is strictly prohibited.154  
                                                        
148 See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (1983) 
149 See City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisc. Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 176 
(1976) (“[W]hen the [school] board sits in public meetings to conduct public business and hear the views 
of citizens, it may not be required to discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment, or 
the content of their speech.”). 
150 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (“Through its policy of accommodating their 
meetings, the University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, 
the University has assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable 
constitutional norms.”). 
151 See Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (concluding that the 
auditoriums at issue “were public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive activities”). 
152
 See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (requiring states that choose to indefinitely retain the open 
character of the facility to do so “by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum”). 
153 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387 (1993) (school 
district restricted the use of school property after school hours to social, civic, and recreational uses of 
such property). 
154 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (describing the regulation of 
designated public forums as “subject to the same limitations as that governing a traditional public 
forum”). Members of the Court have had a difficult time agreeing upon what constitutes a permissible 
subject matter or content restriction within a limited public forum and what constitutes an impermissible 
viewpoint restriction within limited public forums. In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of 
Virginia, for example, the forum at issue was the University’s funding scheme for student publications, 
which authorized payment from the Student Activities Fund for the costs of printing of student 
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Thus, within traditional public forums such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, and within 
designated public forums such as public meeting places devoted to expression on particular 
subjects, individuals enjoy their most robust rights of free expression.  Government restrictions 
on speech within both types of public forums are subject to the most stringent scrutiny. Speech 
restrictions will not be upheld unless they serve compelling government interests and are the 
least restrictive means of restricting such speech. Content-based discrimination is generally 
prohibited,155 and viewpoint-based discrimination is absolutely prohibited, within such forums. 
In circumstances where it is unclear whether the government has designated a public 
forum by opening up a nontraditional forum for public discourse, courts will look predominantly 
to two factors: (1) the policy and practice of the government or the government official with 
respect to its use of the property; (2) the nature of the property at issue and the compatibility of 
the property with expressive activity.156 Although the government will frequently have the 
incentive to argue that it did not open up the property at issue at all, or for the type of speech that 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
publications but prohibited payment from the Fund for the costs of printing for any publication that 
“primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” 515 U.S. 
819, 836 (1995). The student publication “Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective At the University of 
Virginia,” which published a journal that offered a “Christian perspective” on issues such as racism, crisis 
pregnancy, homosexuality, and eating disorders, was denied funding under this scheme, and sued. See id. 
at 826-27. The Justices agreed that the funding scheme constituted a limited public forum for private 
speech, but disagreed as to whether limiting funding only to those student publications that did not 
“primarily promote or manifest a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality” constituted a 
subject matter/topic restriction or a viewpoint restriction. Id. at 836. In the Opinion of the Court, Justice 
Kennedy explained that this restriction amounted to viewpoint discrimination, because it was the religious 
perspective of the journal, rather than the subjects discussed, that triggered the university’s refusal to pay 
for the printing costs of the journal. See id. 68 at 834. In his dissent, Justice Souter construed the 
restriction as a permissible subject matter restriction of denying funding for “the entire subject matter of 
religious apologetics,” not an impermissible restriction on the basis of viewpoint and concluded that if the 
policy at issue in the case “amounts to viewpoint discrimination, the Court has all but eviscerated the line 
between viewpoint and content.” Id. at 896-98 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
155 Restrictions based on content or topic are only permitted only where necessary to confine the limited 
purpose designated public forum to the limited purposes for which it was created. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 
515 U.S. at (explaining that “the necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes 
for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for … the discussion of certain topics. . . .”). 
156 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802. 
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the petitioner seeks to engage in, courts generally will look not just to the government’s claims 
on this issue but to objective factors surrounding the policy and practice of the government, the 
nature of the property, and its compatibility with expressive activity.   
For example, in the case of City of Madison, Joint School District #8 v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission, the School Board and the City of Madison, Wisconsin, 
maintained that they had opened up a public forum that was limited in scope and that they were 
justified in limiting petitioner’s speech on the grounds that it was outside that limited scope.157 
The Court held that, once a meeting of the Board of Education had been made open to the public, 
the Board could not discriminate against speakers on the basis of their viewpoint.158 In that case, 
the school board and the City of Madison had convened a public meeting with a broad agenda 
(which included employment matters) and invited all members of the public to attend.159 During 
the meeting, the Board sought to silence the speech of an individual who intended to speak on 
collective bargaining matters.160  While recognizing that the School Board was entitled to 
conduct private meetings that were not open to the public and to limit the agenda of its meetings, 
the Court explained that, once the Board opened up its meetings to the public for direct citizen 
involvement and sat to conduct public business and hear the views of its citizens, it could not 
silence a speaker “seeking to express his views on an important decision of the government,” nor 
could it discriminate among speakers on the basis of the viewpoint or content of their speech or 
the nature of their employment.161  The Court observed that “to permit one side of a debatable 
public question to have a monopoly in expressing its views to the government is the antithesis of 
                                                        
157 429 U.S. 167, 172 (1976) 
158 See Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 175. 
159 See Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 171. 
160 See Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 173. 
161 Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 175. 
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constitutional guarantees.”162   Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, emphasized that it was 
constitutionally impermissible for the government to allow for selective exclusions from public 
forums it had opened up, explaining that, in the case at bar, “the state body has created a public 
forum dedicated to the expression of views by the general public” and that "once a forum is 
opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from 
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say.”163  
Similarly, in the case of Widmar v. Vincent, the government sought to maintain that it had 
opened up a public forum of a limited scope, not including religious purposes, but the Court held 
that objective factors supported the conclusion that the forum was not so limited.164  In that case, 
the University of Missouri at Kansas City had adopted the policy and practice of making its 
meeting facilities generally available to all registered student groups, but sought to limit the 
facilities’ use to non-religious purposes and discussions.165 The Court found that the University’s 
policy evidenced a clear intent to create a public forum for use by all registered student groups, 
and therefore held that the university could not withhold access from student groups and 
speakers based on the desire to use this generally open forum to engage in religious 
discussion.166  
The Supreme Court has also emphasized that, in evaluating a petitioner’s First 
Amendment claims under the public forum doctrine, the court must look not just to the property 
at issue but to the nature of the access sought by the petitioner. For example, in Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., the NAACP challenged its exclusion from the 
                                                        
162 Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 175-76. 
163 Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 179. 
164 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) 
165 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265. 
166 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. 
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Combined Federal Campaign, an annual charitable fund-raising drive conducted through the 
federal workplace during work hours through the voluntary efforts of public employees.167 In 
evaluating the NAACP’s claims, the Court emphasized that the access the Fund sought was not 
to the federal workplace itself, but rather to participation as one of the choices in the fund-raising 
drive established by the Combined Federal Campaign.168 In Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Ass’n, the Court examined petitioners’ request to access a public school’s 
internal mail system in order to distribute literature.169  In ruling on petitioners’ First 
Amendment claim, the Court focused on the specific access sought by petitioner, which was 
access to the internal mail system, not access to the public school property in general.170  
Similarly, in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, while petitioners sought access to a public 
park -- which has long been viewed as a traditional or quintessential public forum -- the nature of 
the access sought by petitioners was access to install a permanent monument, instead of access 
for purposes of speaking or assembly.171  
The Supreme Court has also made clear that, in order to constitute a designated public 
forum, the place in which speech occurs need not be an actual physical place.  Rather, the Court 
has recently explained that public forums may also include virtual or "metaphysical" forums, like 
funding and solicitation schemes,172 the airwaves,173 cable television,174 and now, Internet 
                                                        
167 473 U.S. 788, 790-93 (1985). 
168 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801. 
169 420 U.S. 546, 39 (1975) 
170 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983). 
171 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009). 
172 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 835 
(1995)(university funding scheme for student publications constituted limited purpose designated public 
forum, in which viewpoint discrimination was prohibited); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (Combined Federal Campaign, an annual charitable fund-
raising drive conducted through the federal workplace during work hours through the voluntary efforts of 
public employees, was a nonpublic forum in which viewpoint discrimination was prohibited). 
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forums for expression as well.175  For example, in Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the 
University of Virginia, Justice Kennedy made clear that the University of Virginia's funding 
scheme for student publications -- through which the university authorized the payment of 
outside contractors for the printing costs of a variety of student publications -- constituted a 
(limited purpose) designated public forum, within which viewpoint discrimination was 
prohibited.176  
 Justice Kennedy's interpretation of the public forum doctrine has been particularly 
sensitive to the importance of the evolution of the doctrine in light of modern developments and 
new forums for expression. His opinion in the case of International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness v. Lee177 is illustrative.  In ISKCON v. Lee, members of the International Society 
for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) sought to engage in their religious practice of sankirtan, 
which involved “going into public places, disseminating religious literature, and soliciting funds 
to support the religion.”178 The public places the practitioners chose in which to distribute 
literature and solicit funds were three major New York area airports -- Kennedy, La Guardia, and 
Newark -- all of which were owned and managed by the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey (a public entity).179 These airports and associated terminals serve as thoroughfares for 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
173 See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998) (suggesting that if 
televised political debate had an “open-microphone format,” it would constitute a designated public 
forum). 
174 See, e.g., Denver Area Educational Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 774-75 
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (public access channels, which were channels that were available at low 
or no cost to members of the public, constituted designated public forums, and therefore cable operators’ 
speech restrictions within such forums were subject to stringent scrutiny). 
175 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (identifying cyberspace as “the most 
important place[] . . . for the exchange of views”).  
176 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at830 (designating the student activity fund as a forum, despite being “a 
forum more in the metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense”). 
177  505 U.S. 672 (1992). 
178  Lee, 505 U.S. at 674. 
179 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 675-76. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249489 
35  
approximately 100 million passengers annually, along with other members of the public.180 The 
Port Authority adopted a regulation prohibiting both the repetitive distribution of literature and 
the solicitation of funds within the airport terminals, and ISKCON sought a declaratory judgment 
that the regulation violated its members’ First Amendment rights.181   
ISKCON advanced a functional interpretation of the public forum doctrine that 
emphasized the historic, speech-facilitating nature of transportation nodes (like rail and bus 
stations, wharves, and ports like Ellis Island), and contended that such sites historically served as 
important forums for expression.182 Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected this functional 
interpretation of the doctrine in favor of a narrower reading, and concluded that, “given the 
lateness with which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the 
description [from Hague v. CIO] of having immemorially … time out of mind been held in trust 
and used for purposes of expressive activity.”183   Accordingly, Rehnquist found that airport 
terminals did not constitute a traditional public forum.184 Furthermore, according to Rehnquist, 
airport terminals did not constitute “designated public forums” because the government owner 
was -- as is often the case in public forum litigation  -- contesting their use for expressive 
purposes and could not be said to have “intentionally opened by their operators to such 
[expressive] activity.”185  In nearly every public forum case before the courts, the government 
will be contesting the exercise of free speech rights on government property and will contend 
that it did not take the requisite steps to create a “designated public forum.”186  
                                                        
180  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 675. 
181  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 676. 
182 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 681. 
183 Lee, 505 U.S. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 
184 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 680. 
185 Lee, 505 U.S. at 680  
186 Having concluded that the airport terminals were non-public forums, Rehnquist evaluated the Port 
Authority’s ban on distribution of literature and solicitation of funds under a “reasonableness” standard, 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249489 
36  
 Justice Kennedy (writing for himself and Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter) 
criticized Rehnquist’s miserly interpretation of the public forum doctrine, on the grounds that it 
left “almost no scope for the development of new public forums absent the rare approval of the 
government.”187 Kennedy explained that the purposes of the public forum doctrine could not be 
given effect unless the Court undertakes an objective, functional inquiry, based on the actual 
characteristics and uses of the property.188  Under such an inquiry, Kennedy maintained, the 
Court should recognize that open public spaces and thoroughfares that are suitable for discourse, 
like airport terminals, should be conceptualized as public forums, whatever their historical 
pedigree.189 Absent such a functional interpretation, Kennedy argued, the public forum doctrine 
“retains no relevance in times of fast-changing technology.”190 Rejecting the strict 
“traditionality” inquiry adopted by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy instead advanced a 
functional, evolving interpretation of the public forum doctrine, which took into account the fact 
that airport terminals are among the few open spaces where people have extended contact with 
other members of the public, and which, like streets, have areas that are “open to the public 
without restriction.”191  
 Justice Kennedy went on to criticize Rehnquist’s “designated public forum” analysis, 
under which the government is granted the discretion to “restrict speech by fiat.”192 Under 
Rehnquist’s analysis, if the government does not expressly designate property as a public forum 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
under which the bans were readily upheld. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 685 (“The inconvenience to passengers 
and the burdens on Port Authority officials flowing from solicitation activity may seem small, but viewed 
against the fact that ‘pedestrian congestion is one of the greatest problems facing the three terminals,’ the 
Port Authority could reasonably worry that even such incremental effects would prove quite disruptive.”).  
187 Lee, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
188 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
189 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 697 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
190  Lee, 505 U.S. at 697 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
191 Lee, 505 U.S. at 700 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
192  Lee, 505 U.S. at 694 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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(and thereby assume the burden not to regulate speech on that property), the public enjoys no 
meaningful free speech rights on such property.193  This understanding of the “designated public 
forum” doctrine would allow the government to easily evade its affirmative obligations under the 
First Amendment.  Rehnquist’s failure to “recognize the possibility that new types of 
government property may be appropriate forums for speech [would] lead to a serious curtailment 
of our expressive activity,”194 as Justice Kennedy explained:  
[U]nder the Court's view, the authority of the government to control speech on its 
property is paramount, for in almost all cases the critical step in the Court's 
analysis is a classification of the property that turns on the government's own 
definition or decision, unconstrained by an independent duty to respect the speech 
its citizens can voice there . . . .  
The Court's approach is contrary to the underlying purposes of the public forum 
doctrine. The liberties protected by our doctrine . . . are essential to a functioning 
democracy …. Public places are of necessity the locus for discussion of public 
issues, as well as protest against arbitrary government action. At the heart of our 
jurisprudence lies the principle that in a free nation citizens must have the right to 
gather and speak with other persons in public places. The recognition that certain 
government-owned property is a public forum provides open notice to citizens 
that their freedoms may be exercised there without fear of a censorial 
government, adding tangible reinforcement to the idea that we are a free people… 
[T]he policies underlying the [public forum] doctrine cannot be given effect 
unless we recognize that open, public spaces and thoroughfares that are suitable 
for discourse may be public forums, whatever their historical pedigree and 
without concern for a precise classification of the property.195 
 
 Justice Kennedy continued to develop his evolving, functional view of the public forum 
doctrine in the 1996 case of Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. 
                                                        
193 See Lee, 505 U.S. at  697 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The requirements for such a designation are so 
stringent that I cannot be certain whether the category has any content left at all. In any event, it seems 
evident that under the Court’s analysis today few, if any, types of property other than those already 
recognized as public forums will be accorded that status.”). 
194 Lee, 505 U.S. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
195 Lee, 505 U.S. at   695-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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F.C.C.196  In that case, the Court evaluated various F.C.C. orders implementing provisions of the 
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act that governed “indecent” and 
obscene programming.197 One of the challenged F.C.C. orders permitted cable operators to 
prohibit patently offensive or indecent programming on “public access channels” – channels that 
were available at low or no cost to members of the public.198  In Justice Kennedy's view, these 
public access channels met the definition of a “designated public forum” – “property that the 
State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public”199 – and therefore 
government-authorized speech restrictions by cable operators within such forums were subject to 
stringent scrutiny.200 First, Kennedy explained, the nominally private ownership of these forums 
(by cable operators) did not insulate them from the reach of the public forum doctrine: “[p]ublic 
access channels . . . are public fora even though they operate over property to which the cable 
operator holds title.”201 Second, Kennedy explained, in providing public access channels under 
their franchise agreements: 
[C]able operators therefore are not exercising their own First Amendment 
rights.  [Rather,] [t]hey serve as conduits for the speech of others. … 
Treating [public] access channels as public fora does not just place a label 
on them . . . . It defines the First Amendment rights of speakers seeking to 
use the channels.  When property has been dedicated to public expressive 
activities, by tradition or government designation, access is protected by 
the First Amendment.202                                                         
196 518 U.S. 727 (1996).  In Denver Area, both the plurality (Justices Breyer, Stevens, O’Connor, and 
Souter) and the dissent (Justices Thomas and Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist) refused to characterize 
the forum at issue as a public forum.  
197 See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 735. 
198 See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 736. 
199 Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 791 (Kennedy J., joined by Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (quoting International Soc. 
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)). 
200 See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 794  (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 678) 
(“Regulations of speech content in a designated public forum, whether of limited or unlimited character, 
are ‘subject to the highest scrutiny’ and ‘survive only if they are narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling 
state interest.’”). 
201 Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 792. 
202 Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 793-94. 
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Justice Kennedy explained that the purpose underlying the public forum doctrine – to ensure 
open, nondiscriminatory access to the means of communication – was evident in the legislation 
under which the F.C.C. was regulating, and that the public forum doctrine must be meaningfully 
extended to new media:   
Giving Government free rein to exclude speech it dislikes ... would have 
pernicious effects in the modern age. Minds are not changed in streets and 
parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant 
interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in mass 
and electronic media. The extent of public entitlement to participate in 
those means of communication may be changed as technologies change; 
and in expanding those entitlements the Government has no greater right 
to discriminate on suspect grounds than it does when it effects a ban on 
speech against the backdrop of the entitlements to which we have been 
more accustomed.203 
 
Kennedy concluded that in order for the First Amendment to remain meaningful in the modern 
era, the public forum doctrine must be extended to new technologies, to prevent government (and 
government-like actors operating public forums) from exercising the power to discriminate 
against disfavored expression.204  
 Justice Kennedy continued to develop his expansive, functional view of the public forum 
doctrine in the 2017 case of Packingham v. North Carolina.205 In that case, Lester Packingham -- 
an individual who was required to register as a sex offender after having sex with a 13 year old 
girl when he was 21 -- challenged a North Carolina law that prohibited any and all use by 
                                                        
203 Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 802-03 (citations omitted). 
204 See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 776-77 (“[A]s broadcast, cable, and the 
cybertechnology of the Internet and the World Wide Web approach the day of using a common receiver, 
we can hardly assume that standards for judging the regulation of one of them will not have immense, but 
now unknown and unknowable, effects on the others.”). 
205 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
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registered sex offenders of social media sites like Twitter and Facebook.206  Packingham, in 
violation of the state law, created a Facebook account using a pseudonym and posted a message 
praising God and Jesus for his good fortune after a state court dismissed a traffic ticket against 
him.207  After police tracked him down and identified him as the creator of the pseudonymous 
Facebook account, Packingham was convicted of felony charges for violating the state law and 
given a suspended prison sentence.208  Packingham challenged the law, claiming it violated his 
First Amendment rights.209 
                                                        
206 See Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1734; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. Sections 14-202.5(a) (2015) makes it a 
felony for a registered sex offender to "access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex 
offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain person 
Web pages."  The statute defines "commercial social networking Web site" as a website that (1) “[i]s 
operated by a person who derives revenue from membership fees, advertising, or other sources related to 
the operation of the Web site”; (2) “[f]acilitates the social introduction between two or more persons for 
the purposes of friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchanges” (3) “[a]llows users to create 
Web pages or personal profiles that contain information such as the name or nickname of the user, 
photographs placed on the personal Web page by the user, other personal information about the user, and 
links to other personal Web pages on the commercial social networking Web site of friends or associates 
of the user that may be accessed by other users or visitors to the Web site” and (4) “[p]rovides users or 
visitors . . . mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a message board, chat room, electronic 
mail, or instant messenger.” N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. Sections 14-202.5 (b). Two exceptions to this definition 
are provided. The statutory bar does not extend to websites that “[p]rovid[e] only one of the following 
discrete services: photo-sharing, electronic mail, instant messenger, or chat room or message board 
platform” nor to websites that have as their “primary purpose the facilitation of commercial transactions 
involving goods or services between [their] members or visitors.” §14–202.5(c)(1),(2). 
 
207 Packingham, who had created a Facebook account under the pseudonym "J.R. Gerrard," was relieved 
to learn that a state court had dismissed a traffic ticket against him and in response logged onto his 
Facebook page and posted the following statement: 
 
Man God is Good! How about I got so much favor they dismissed the ticket before court 
even started? No fine, no court cost, no nothing spent. . . . . . Praise be to GOD, WOW! 
Thanks JESUS! Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1734. 
 
A police officer investigating registered sex offenders who were thought to be violating the state law 
prohibiting them from accessing social media discovered that a traffic citation for Packingham had been 
dismissed around the time of this Facebook post. See id. The officer obtained a search warrant and 
determined that Packingham was the author of the above post on Facebook, which led to Packingham's 
conviction for violating the state statute. See id. 
208 See Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1734. 
209 See Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1734. 
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  Justice Kennedy, in the Opinion of the Court, struck down the state law's broad 
prohibition on access to social media sites by registered sex offenders, explaining that social 
media sites like Facebook and Twitter serve important free speech functions and that prohibiting 
registered sex offenders (of whom there were 20,000 in the state, whose status as sex offenders 
could endure for 30 years or more) impermissibly thwarted those important free speech 
functions.210 Kennedy focused in particular on the important functions served by the public 
forum doctrine, explaining that: “A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all 
persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak 
and listen once more.”211 Kennedy noted that streets and parks were the "quintessential forum[s] 
for the exercise of First Amendment rights" and that such traditional public forums -- even in the 
modern age -- are still essential venues for citizens to exercise these rights -- for "public 
gatherings to celebrate some views, to protest others, or simply to learn and inquire."212 He 
acknowledged that the Court had some difficulty in the past determining which venues beyond 
streets, sidewalks, and parks should be considered public forums, but that the emergence of the 
Internet in general and social media on the Internet in particular simplified such inquiries: 
"While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places… for 
the exchange of views, today the answer is clear... It is cyberspace – the ‘vast democratic forums 
of the Internet’ in general, and social media in particular.”213 Kennedy went on to identify 
Facebook and Twitter as the most significant social media forums, and characterized Twitter in 
particular as a forum where "users can petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage 
with them in a direct manner," since "Governors of all 50 States and almost every Member of                                                         
210 See Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1734, 1743. 
211 Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1735. 
212 Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1735. 
213 Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1735. 
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Congress" employ Twitter as a forum in which to engage with constituents.214  Kennedy noted 
that, as with traditional public forums of streets, sidewalks, and parks, social media sites offer 
"relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds," where users can 
"engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics ‘as diverse as human 
thought.’"215  Social media, Kennedy explained, "allows users to gain access to information and 
communicate with one another about it on any subject that might come to mind... [and constitute] 
principal sources for knowing current events, ... speaking and listening in the modern public 
square, ... exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge, . . . [and are] the most 
powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard."216 In 
summary, Kennedy observed that the Internet in general and social media in particular have "vast 
potential to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be."217 In light of 
the important role social media serve in advancing free speech values, the Court held that the 
state law's sweeping ban on registered sex offenders' access to social media -- forums that are 
"integral to the fabric of modern society and culture" -- could not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.218 
B. Public Forums on Privately-Owned Property 
Although public forums generally involve government-owned property, the Court has 
made clear that, in order to constitute a public forum, the space at issue need not be owned by the 
government; rather, a public forum can exist where the underlying property is privately-owned 
                                                        
214 Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1735. 
215 Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1735 (quoting Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 
(1997)). 
216 Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1737. 
217 Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1736. 
218 Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1738. 
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but controlled by the government.219 If the government seeks to regulate private property that it 
has opened up and designated for use as a public forum, then such regulation must be consistent 
with the strictures of the First Amendment and with the strictures of the public forum doctrine in 
particular.  For example, in Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, the Court held that a privately-
owned theatre under long-term lease to the city of Chattanooga that was “designed for and 
dedicated to expressive activities”220 would be considered a designated public forum and 
therefore the City could not censor the production of the musical “Hair” based on disapproval of 
its content.221  Similarly, in Denver Area, Justice Kennedy explained in his concurring opinion 
that privately-owned cable stations that were controlled by the government and opened up by the 
government for use by the public constituted designated public forums in which government 
regulation was subject to strict scrutiny.222  As discussed above, Denver Area involved various 
Federal Communications Commission orders implementing provisions of the 1984 Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act that governed “indecent” and obscene 
programming, one of which permitted cable operators to prohibit patently offensive or indecent 
                                                        
219 Indeed, the Supreme Court indicated in the seminal public forum case of Hague v. CIO that the public 
or private ownership of the property under consideration was not dispositive of the issue of whether the 
property was a public forum. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). In that 
case the Court, explained that “[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public, and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. . . . [and 
accordingly, the] privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication 
of views on national questions . . . must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
220 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975). See also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Edu. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 
8011985) (In order to invoke the public forum doctrine, “a speaker must seek access to public property or 
to private property dedicated to public use to evoke First Amendment concerns.”) (emphasis added). 
221 See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd, 420 U.S. at 555 (unconstitutional for municipal board of City of 
Chattanooga to reject petition to stage the musical “Hair” at a city-leased theater on the grounds that the 
production would not be “in the best interest of the community,” because theater was a designated public 
forum, notwithstanding the fact that the theater was privately owned, and because rejection constituted 
prior restraint on protected speech without adequate substantive and procedural safeguards.) 
222 See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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programming on public access channels.223  Those defending the constitutionality of the Act’s 
provisions argued that the public forum doctrine was not implicated by the Act’s prohibitions, 
because the conduits for speech at issue were privately owned and because this order merely 
enabled private cable operators to implement speech restrictions, and therefore that the First 
Amendment was not implicated.224  Kennedy rejected both arguments. First, Kennedy explained 
that the Act imposed impermissible content-based restrictions within a designated public forum -
- notwithstanding the fact that the restrictions would be imposed by private cable operators. 
Kennedy explained:  
The public access channels . . . are available at low or no cost to members of the public, 
often on a first-come, first-served basis. . . Public access channels meet the definition of a 
public forum. We have recognized two kinds of public fora. The first and most familiar 
are traditional public fora, like streets, sidewalks, and parks, which by custom have long 
been open for public assembly and discourse. . . . The second category of public property 
is the designated public forum, whether of a limited or unlimited character -- property 
that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public. . . 
Public access channels fall in the second category. Required by the franchise authority as 
a condition of the franchise and open to all comers, [public access channels] are a 
designated public forum of unlimited character. The House Report for the 1984 Cable 
Act ... characterized public access channels as "the video equivalent of the speaker's soap 
box or the electronic parallel to the printed leaflet. They provide groups and individuals 
who generally have not had access to the electronic media with the opportunity to 
become sources of information in the electronic marketplace of ideas." . . . Public fora do 
not have to be physical gathering places, ... nor are they limited to property owned by the 
government... Indeed, in the majority of jurisdictions, title to some of the most traditional 
of public fora, streets and sidewalks, remains in private hands....Public access channels 
are analogous; they are public fora even though they operate over property to which the 
cable operator holds title....225 
Kennedy went on to reject the argument that the Act would merely require private property 
owners (the cable operators) to implement the speech restrictions of their choosing and were 
merely exercising their own First Amendment rights: “In providing public access channels under 
                                                        
223 See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 736. 
224 See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 737. 
225 Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 791-92 (emphasis added). 
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their franchise agreements, cable operators ... are not exercising their own First Amendment 
rights. [Rather, cable operators] serve as conduits for the speech of others. ... By enacting a law 
in 1992 excluding indecent programming from protection ..., the Federal Government at the 
same time ratified the public forum character of public access channels but discriminated against 
certain speech based on its content.”226 Accordingly, Kennedy made clear that government 
restrictions imposed on privately-owned property can constitute impermissible speech 
restrictions within a designated public forum, regardless of the fact that the forum was privately 
owned.  
In summary, from its initial inception in the mid-twentieth century to its complex 
development and evolution over the next century, the public forum doctrine has expanded to 
encompass not just physical property owned by the government, but also "metaphysical" forums 
-- including Internet forums -- that are owned or controlled by government officials.  As a result 
of this evolution, the public forum doctrine continues to be a vibrant and essential doctrine for 
the protection of speech against censorship by government officials in new mediums opened up 
by government officials for expressive purposes. 
C. The Government Speech Doctrine: Distinguishing "Government Speech" from Public 
Forums for Private Speech 
 
 In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has distinguished situations in which the 
government has established public forums for speech -- in which individuals enjoy the robust 
protections of the public forum doctrine -- from situations in which only the government itself is 
speaking -- in which the protections of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment do not 
                                                        
226 Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 793. 
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apply.  In a line of cases beginning with Rust v. Sullivan227 in 1991, the Court has made clear that 
when the government itself, or government officials, are speaking, the mandates of the public 
forum doctrine -- including the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination by the government -
- do not apply.  The Court has since expanded the category of government speech -- in which 
viewpoint discrimination by the government is permitted -- to include cases in which the 
government itself is the speaker as well as instances in which the government is using private 
speakers to transmit its own message.228  
 The distinction between cases in which the government is speaking and cases in which it 
is creating a public forum for the speech of others is not always a clear one, as is seen in cases 
like Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, which involved government restrictions on a private 
organization's requested access to a public park.229  In that case, a religious organization called 
Summum sought to erect a stone monument in Pioneer Park, a public park in Pleasant Grove 
City, Utah.  The monument that the Summum organization sought to erect in the park contained                                                         
227 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Rust v. Sullivan involved a challenge to a set of 1988 regulations issued under 
Title X of the Public Health Service Act of 1970, which prohibited Title X project grantees from, inter 
alia, providing counseling concerning the use of abortion or providing referral for abortion as a method of 
family planning, even upon request from patients. See id. at 179. These regulations were challenged by 
Title X grantees, who claimed that the regulation’s “gag rule” violated their First Amendment rights and 
amounted to illegal viewpoint discrimination within a designated public forum. See id. at 181. The Court, 
in a 5-4 opinion, upheld the regulations and held that the government could constitutionally decide to 
“selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without 
at the same time funding an alternate program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.” Id. 
at 193. Although the Court did not at the time characterize Rust as a case involving government speech, in 
subsequent cases the Court explained that “the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X 
amounted to government speech” and held that  “viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in 
instances in which the government is itself the speaker or instances, like Rust, in which the government 
used private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own program.” See Legal Services Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001). 
228 See Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. at 541 (explaining that "viewpoint-based funding decisions can be 
sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker or ... in which the government used 
private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own program" and stating that "when the 
government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take 
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the 
grantee.") 
229 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249489 
47  
the Seven Aphorisms of Summum, which the organization believes were inscribed on the tablet 
that God handed down to Moses on Mount Sinai.  At the time of Summum's request to install the 
monument, Pioneer Park contained fifteen monuments, eleven of which had been donated by 
private organizations, including a Ten Commandments monument that had been donated by the 
Fraternal Order of Eagles.   The City of Pleasant Grove refused to allow Summum to erect its 
desired monument in the park, and Summum sued, claiming that the City's actions -- by 
accepting other donated monuments while refusing Summum's proffered donation --  constituted 
illegal viewpoint discrimination within a public forum.230 
 The lower court analyzed Summum's request for access to the public park under the 
public forum doctrine and found for Summum.231 The Supreme Court, however, unanimously 
ruled in favor of the City and held that forum analysis was inappropriate.232 The Court held that, 
in deciding which permanent monuments were to be displayed on public property, the 
government was engaging in government speech, and was not impermissibly discriminating on 
the basis of viewpoint within a public forum for private speech.233 While acknowledging that 
public parks are traditional public forums to which individuals have a right of access for 
purposes such as delivering speeches and holding marches and demonstrations, the Court 
explained that forum analysis did not apply to the specific type of access sought here -- the 
erection of a permanent monument in the public park.234  The Court indicated that the relevant 
inquiry involved whether the forum could accommodate the types of requests for access from 
private parties at issue, and concluded that it could not: 
                                                        
230 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 466. 
231 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 464. 
232 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 481 
233 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 472. 
234 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 466. 
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The forum doctrine has been applied in situations in which government-
owned property or a government program was capable of accommodating 
a large number of public speakers without defeating the essential function 
of the land or the program.  For example, a park can accommodate many 
speakers and, over time, many parades and demonstrations....By contrast, 
public parks can accommodate only a limited number of permanent 
monuments . . . It is hard to imagine how a public park could be opened 
for the installation of permanent monuments by every person or group 
wishing to engage in that form of expression. . .  [Indeed,] if public parks 
were considered to be traditional public forums for the purpose of erecting 
privately donated monuments, most parks would have little choice but to 
refuse all such donations ... and application of forum analysis would lead 
almost inexorably to the closing of the forum.235  
 
Holding that the selection of which permanent monuments to allow in a public park constituted 
government speech, the Court concluded that the City's selection decision was not subject to 
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.236 
The Court adopted a similar approach in analyzing a state program for specialty license 
plates in the recent case of Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans.237  In Walker, 
the Sons of Confederate Veterans -- a non-profit organization that works to preserve the memory 
and reputation of soldiers who fought for the confederacy in the Civil War -- applied to have a 
new specialty license plate recognized and issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles 
(TDMV).238  The Sons of Confederate Veterans sought approval for its specialty license plate 
design that featured the Confederate battle flag.239 The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles had 
a policy stating that it "may refuse to create a new specialty license plate if the design might be 
                                                        
235 Summum, 555 U.S. at 478-80. 
236 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 481. The Court explained, “the City’s decision to accept certain privately 
donated monuments while rejecting [Summum’s] is best viewed as a form of government speech. As a 
result, the City’s decision is not subject to the Free Speech Clause . . . .” Id. at 481. The Court held, 
however, that the City's decisions must comply with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
237 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
238 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245. 
239 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245. 
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offensive to any member of the public."240 Although hundreds of other specialty license plates 
had been approved by Department -- including a "Buffalo Soldiers" license plate that certain 
Native Americans objected to, on the grounds that it was offensive to them -- the Department 
refused to approve the Sons of Confederate Veterans proposed plate on the ground that it was 
potentially offensive to others.241 The Sons of the Confederate Veterans organization sued the 
state, claiming that the state had opened up a public forum for speech when it created the 
specialty license plate program and when the Department thereafter approved hundreds of other 
plates with a variety of messages (some of which were offensive to some groups).242  
The Supreme Court disagreed.243 Relying heavily on its Pleasant Grove v. Summum 
decision, the Court in a 5-4 decision concluded that the state's specialty license plate program 
constituted government speech and therefore that government decisions in selecting which plates 
to approve and which to reject did not create a public forum for speech (and need not be 
viewpoint neutral).244 In adopting the government speech framework, the Court primarily looked 
to three factors. First, the Court explained that license plates, like permanent monuments in 
public parks, "long have communicated messages from the States."245 Second, the Court 
explained that license plates, like permanent monuments in public parks, are "often closely 
identified in the public mind with the [State]" since they serve as a form of a government ID, 
notwithstanding the fact that private parties were involved in the creation of the specialty license 
plate messages.246 Third, the Court observed that the state maintained direct control over the 
                                                        
240 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2244-45. 
241 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2258, 2245. 
242 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245. 
243  See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250. 
244  See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246. 
245 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at2248 
246 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248. 
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messages conveyed on its specialty license plates.247  In the majority's view, all three factors 
pointed to the conclusion that the messages on the specialty license plates constituted 
government speech, not private speech within a designated public forum opened up by the 
government, and therefore that the strictures of the Free Speech Clause did not apply.248  The 
four dissenting Justices criticized the majority's decision and warned that the government speech 
doctrine, if applied too broadly, could swallow up the First Amendment's crucial protections for 
unpopular speech.249   
In subsequent cases, the Court has made clear that the Walker decision constituted the 
outer limits of the government speech doctrine and re-emphasized the dangers to free speech in 
applying the government speech doctrine too broadly.  In the recent case of Matal v. Tam, which 
involved the United States Trademark Office’s refusal to register the mark “The Slants” for an 
Asian-American rock band on the principal register on the grounds that the mark was likely to be 
disparaging toward persons of Asian descent, in violation of the Disparagement Clause of the 
                                                        
247 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249. 
248 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249. The Court emphasized that the Establishment Clause was still relevant 
in analyzing whether government speech ran afoul of the First Amendment, for example, in cases where 
the government adopted a religious message on a specialty license plate. 
249 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito criticized the majority’s 
characterization of the state specialty license plate program as government speech instead of a limited 
public forum and claimed that the majority’s approach severely limited the First Amendment’s 
protections for unpopular viewpoints:  
 
The Court’s decision passes off private speech as government speech and, in doing so, establishes 
a precedent that threatens private speech that government finds displeasing. Under our First 
Amendment cases, the distinction between government speech and private speech is critical. The 
First Amendment does not regulate government speech, and therefore when government speaks, 
it is free to select the views that it wants to express.... By contrast, in the realm of private speech 
or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another.... Unfortunately, 
the Court’s decision categorizes private speech as government speech and thus strips it of all First 
Amendment protection.... This capacious understanding of government speech takes a large and 
painful bite out of the First Amendment. Id. at 2254-55 (Alito, J.,  dissenting) (citations omitted, 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Lanham Act,250 the Trademark Office argued that its selection of which marks to register and 
which to refuse constituted government speech, not private speech, and therefore its selection 
decisions were not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.251 The Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected the government’s attempt to extend the government speech doctrine to this 
context, and held that the Trademark Office’s refusal to register the mark at issue amounted to 
illegal viewpoint discrimination against private speech, not government speech that was immune 
from scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.252 In so doing, the Court cautioned against the 
government's proposed “huge and dangerous” expansion of the government speech doctrine:253   
[W]hile the government-speech doctrine is important—indeed, essential—it is a 
doctrine that is susceptible to dangerous misuse. If private speech could be passed 
off as government speech by simply affixing a government seal of approval, 
government could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints. For 
this reason, we must exercise great caution before extending our government-
speech precedents.254 
 
III. Forum Analysis of Government Officials' Blocking Constituents from Accessing Their 
Social Media Sites  
 
A. Introduction  
Having explored the contours of the modern public forum doctrine and the government 
speech doctrine, in this Part, I turn to an analysis of the actions of government officials in 
blocking their constituents from accessing their social media accounts.  In both the case                                                         
250 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). The Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 
1946 prohibits the registration on the Principal Register of trademarks that “consists of or comprises 
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection 
with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or 
disrepute.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
251 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1757. 
252 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760. 
253 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760 (“For if the registration of trademarks constituted government speech, other 
systems of government registration could easily be characterized in the same way.”). See also Steven G. 
Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government Has Nothing 
to Say?, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1259, 1311 (2010) (claiming that courts must “restrict the application of the 
government speech doctrine to situations where the exercise of free speech rights by private citizens 
would thwart the government’s ability to communicate with the public”). 
254 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1758. 
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involving Loudoun County Commissioner Randall and the case involving Maryland Governor 
Hogan, constituents were blocked from commenting on the government officials' Facebook 
page.255 In Hogan's case, his constituents were blocked pursuant to an official government social 
media policy, which provided that his Facebook page was established to serve as a "forum for 
constructive and respectful discussion with and among users" and that constituents' comments on 
Hogan's Facebook page could be deleted "at any time . . . without providing justification."256  
Pursuant to this policy, as discussed above, Hogan and his administration blocked constituents 
from commenting on his Facebook page after they questioned or criticized his policies.257   In the 
Virginia case, Loudoun County Commissioner Phyllis Randall operated an unofficial Facebook 
page and made a unilateral decision to block her constituent's comment (not pursuant to a 
government social media policy).258 In both cases, constituents were blocked and their comments 
were removed because of the government official's disagreement with the viewpoint expressed 
by the constituent.  The Maryland case, in which the American Civil Liberties Union challenged 
the blocking of constituents pursuant to the Governor's social media policy, was settled, with the 
Hogan administration agreeing to modify its social media policy to comply with the dictates of 
the First Amendment.259 The Virginia case is ongoing, as I discuss below. 
B. County Commissioner Randall’s Unofficial Facebook Page as Public Forum: Davison v. 
Loudoun County Board of Supervisors                                                         
255 See discussion supra. 
256 Exhibit A to Complaint, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017) 
257 See Complaint at 3, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017) 
258 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 715 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017) 
259 See Laurenson v. Hogan, ACLU MARYLAND, https://www.aclu-md.org/en/cases/laurenson-v-hogan 
(last visited July 28, 2018) (“The ACLU reached a settlement in the case that includes a new social media 
policy that will govern Gov. Hogan's Facebook page, mandates the creation of a second Facebook page 
dedicated to providing a public forum where constituents can raise a host of issues for the governor's 
attention, and creates an appeals process for constituents who feel their comments have been improperly 
deleted, or that they have been wrongfully blocked.”). See generally Office of the Governor Social-Media 
Policy, Office of Governor Larry Hogan,http://governor.maryland.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/social-media-policy.pdf (last visited July 28, 2018). 
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 In Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, the parties primarily dispute 
whether the unofficial Facebook page of Chair Phyllis Randall -- from which constituent Brian 
Davison was blocked after he posted a critical comment -- constituted a public forum for 
purposes of the First Amendment.260  Randall argues that, in creating her unofficial Facebook 
page, she did not create a public forum for the private speech of others.261 She maintains instead 
that the Facebook page is her own private speech forum -- on which she cannot be compelled to 
adopt someone else's comments -- or, in the alternative, that her Facebook page is government 
speech, which is immune from scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.262 Randall argues further 
that the public forum doctrine is inapplicable because Facebook is a private entity.263 She 
maintains that the public forum doctrine is only applicable to publicly-owned property and 
cannot properly be invoked in the context of a privately-owned website like Facebook.264 
Adverting to the fact that Facebook has its own content removal guidelines and its own First 
Amendment rights at stake, Randall maintains that her decision to block access to her page on 
this privately-owned forum does not implicate the public forum doctrine.265 In response, her 
blocked constituent Davison argues that, despite the fact that Randall's Facebook page is 
unofficial, it nonetheless constitutes a government-run and government-controlled forum, on                                                         
260 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 711 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
261 See Defendant-Appellant Phyllis J. Randall's Informal Opening Brief at 7, Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. 
Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
262 See id. at 7-10. 
263 See id. at 8. 
264 See id. at 7. 
265 See id. at 8. See also Defendants Loudoun County Board of Supervisors and Phyllis Randall's 
Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment Filed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) at 17, 
Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, (E.D. Va.  2017) (No. 1:16 Civ. 
00932) (“Facebook . . . retains control of Facebook page content by imposing specific terms and 
conditions . . .As conceded by Davison, due to Facebook’s internal software, anyone can mark his 
postings as span which would cause Facebook to suppress his comments, without any action taken by the 
government . . . It is Facebook’s created software which allows this to occur and to which Davison 
objects . . . .”). 
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which Randall expressly invited constituents to comment on any and all manner of subjects, and 
that Commissioner Randall thereby created a designated public forum, within which viewpoint 
discrimination is impermissible.266 
 The district court in Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors properly rejected 
Randall's argument that her Facebook page was her personal/private speech, as well as her 
argument in the alternative that the page constituted government speech immune from public 
forum analysis.  First, in analyzing whether Randall's Facebook page was personal or 
governmental, the district court looked to whether her actions in connection with the page had a 
sufficiently close nexus with the state such as to be fairly treated as the actions of the 
government itself, considering the totality of the relevant circumstances.267  The district court 
observed, on the one hand, that certain facts weighed in favor of considering the Facebook page 
as Randall’s private speech.268  Randall's official duties as County Commissioner do not include 
the maintenance of a social media site, and Randall's Facebook page will not revert to the county 
government when Randall leaves office.269  Further, Randall does not use government-issued 
electronic devices to maintain her Facebook page, and much of her Facebook activity generally 
takes place outside of her physical government office and outside of her official working 
hours.270   However, the district court was more persuaded by the factors weighing in favor of 
considering Randall's Facebook page to be governmental and having a sufficiently close nexus 
                                                        
266 See Second Amended Complaint at 8, Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 
702 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
267 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 720 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017) 
(“[T]his case concerns apparently private actions that have a sufficiently close nexus with the State to be 
fairly treated as the actions of the State itself.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
268 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
269 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
270 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
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with the state.271  First, and most importantly, Randall used her Facebook page as a tool of 
governance and as a vehicle to engage with her constituents with respect to her official 
government activities.272  She expressly requested that her citizens use her Facebook page as a 
channel for "back and forth constituent conversations" with her, and the content on her page is 
predominantly related to her official government actions and duties.273  In addition, her 
Facebook page has been designated in many ways as governmental not personal.274  The title of 
the page includes Randall's governmental title, the page is designated as that of a government 
official, and lists Randall's official email address, telephone number, and web address.275 
Furthermore, Randall's motivation for banning Davison from her Facebook page was because he 
criticized her colleagues in county government.276  The district court found that this censorial 
motive related to the conduct of Randall's official government duties.277  In considering the 
totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that Randall's operation of her Facebook page 
was governmental -- not private -- action. 278  
 Next, the district court properly rejected Randall's argument that her Facebook page 
constituted government speech that was immune from scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.279  
Finally, the district court concluded, based on the multifactor designated public forum analysis, 
that the page constituted a designated public forum for expression.280 The court observed that the 
                                                        
271 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 713 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017) 
(describing Randall’s actions as arising “out of public, not personal, circumstances”). 
272 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 713 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
273 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 713 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
274 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
275 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
276 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
277 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
278 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
279 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714-18 (E.D. Va. May 10, 
2017). 
280 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 718 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
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government may open a forum for speech by creating a website in which private viewers could 
"express opinions or post information” or otherwise where the government “invite[s] or allow[s] 
private persons to publish information or their positions.”281  Referring to the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the creation of Randall's Facebook page, the district court found that 
Randalls had done just that.282  Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Packingham v. North 
Carolina, the district court held that "[w]hen one creates a Facebook page, one generally opens a 
digital space for the exchange of ideas and information."283 The court noted that Randall 
explicitly allowed and invited public comment on her Facebook page when she expressly 
solicited comments from her constituents by stating: "Everyone, could you do me a favor. I 
really want to hear from ANY Loudoun citizen on ANY issues, request, criticism, compliment, 
or just your thoughts."284 Specifically, Commissioner Randall invited her constituents to initiate 
and engage in "back and forth conversations" with her on "ANY issues" on the page.285 The 
court properly held that this language and this open invitation constituted the “designation of a 
place or channel of communication for use by the public,” which created a public forum for 
speech.286  Because Randall "allowed virtually unfettered discussion” and “affirmatively 
solicited comments from her constituents” on her Facebook page, Randall created a public forum 
for private speech that was subject to the strictures of the First Amendment.287 Accordingly, 
                                                        
281 Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017) 
(quoting Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cir. 2008)). 
282 See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
283 Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017)  
(citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017)). 
284 Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
285 Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
286 Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
287 Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
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Randall’s actions of deleting Davison’s comments because of her disagreement with him 
constituted illegal viewpoint discrimination within a public forum.288 
C. The President’s Twitter Account as Public Forum: Knight Institute v. Donald J. Trump 
 
 In Knight Institute v. Trump, seven individuals who were blocked from following the 
president on his Twitter account sued the president and other responsible government officials, 
claiming that their First Amendment rights were violated by these actions.289 In this case, the 
parties dispute whether the interactive space within Trump’s @realDonaldTrump Twitter 
account constitutes a public forum within which viewpoint discrimination is illegal.290  The 
Knight First Amendment Institute, which represents seven individuals who were blocked by 
Trump from following him on his @RDT Twitter account, contends that the @RDT account 
constitutes state action, not Trump’s private action; that such state action does not constitute 
government speech that is immune from analysis under the Free Speech Clause, but rather that 
the interactive space associated with this account constitutes a designated public forum within 
which viewpoint discrimination is prohibited.291  President Trump and the other named 
defendants, on the other hand, argue that his @RDT account constitutes his private speech, so he 
is entitled to say what he wants and to block whatever comments he wants; that it is Twitter, a 
private company, not Trump, that enables the blocking of certain individuals from the president’s 
account; and that if, in the alternative, the account constitutes state action not private action, his 
                                                        
288 Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017). 
289 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018). 
290 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018). 
291 See Cross-Motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 12-21, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 
3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
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account constitutes government speech that is immune from analysis under the Free Speech 
Clause (and the public forum doctrine).292  I explore each of these claims in detail below. 
 Both sides in the Trump/Twitter case agree that the 140 (now 280) characters that make 
up each presidential tweet from the @realDonaldTrump account constitute private speech in 
which the president enjoys his own First Amendment rights to say what he wants and that the 
president is constitutionally permitted to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in composing his 
tweets.293  And plaintiffs do not seek to regulate the content or viewpoint of the tweets 
themselves.294 The disputed issue is not with the tweets themselves; rather, it involves the 
interactive space associated within the president’s Twitter account, the space that allows Twitter 
users to interact with the president and with one another in relation to the president's tweets.295  
As both sides stipulate, “Twitter is called a ‘social’ media platform in large part because of 
comment threads, which reflect multiple overlapping ‘conversations’ among and across groups 
of users.”296  Plaintiffs claim that they have a right to access -- and to not be blocked on the basis 
of viewpoint from accessing -- this interactive space, because this interactive space constitutes a                                                         
292 See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 10-22, Knight First Amendment Inst. at 
Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). The defendants 
also contend that the Knight Institute does not have standing to bring the lawsuit, because it has not 
suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact that can be traced to the challenged actions of the 
president, and that the court cannot issue equitable relief against the president. See id. at 5-7. See also 
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 563-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(rejecting challenges to the Knight Institute’s standing) 
293 See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 14, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205); Cross-Motion of Plaintiff 
for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 26, Knight First 
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 
05205). 
294 See Cross-Motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 26, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 
541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)  (“The mere fact that @realDonaldTrump’s tweets constitute 
government speech does not mean that the comment threads associated with is tweets are something other 
than a public forum.”). 
295 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018). 
296 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at551 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249489 
59  
government-controlled, designated public forum for speech, in which viewpoint discrimination is 
prohibited.297  
 Accordingly, the central issue in the Trump/Twitter case is whether the interactive space 
associated with the president’s @RDT Twitter account constitutes a designated public forum in 
which viewpoint discrimination is prohibited.298 Trump and the other defendants argue that the 
interactive space associated with Trump’s account constitutes private action, not state action.299  
As County Commission Randall argued in her case, defendants in the Trump/Twitter case argue 
that the president’s operation of his social media account is not action that is traceable to his 
official powers because: he does not operate the account by virtue of federal law; his use of the 
account is not a right conferred by the presidency; and this account itself was created before he 
became president.300  Defendants contend that decisions regarding which voices to allow in the 
interactive space associated with the president’s Twitter account are similar to the president’s 
decisions regarding whom to interact with in real space, which is a matter of private action not 
state action.301 Defendants contend further that the power to block constituents from the 
interactive space associated with the president’s Twitter account was granted and enabled by 
Twitter (a private entity) and is governed by Twitter’s structural rules and regulations, not by the 
                                                        
297 See Cross-Motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 22, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 
541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
298 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 556. 
299 See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 11, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) (“[T]he President’s use of 
his personal Twitter account is among the ‘acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits [that] are 
plainly excluded’ from state action.”) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
300 See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 12, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). 
301 See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 13, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) (analogizing what Trump’s 
choice of what Twitter accounts to follow and block to Trump’s decision of “what newspapers to pick up 
[and] what news programs to watch”).  
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president.302 Accordingly, defendants claim that decisions regarding the contours of and access 
to the interactive space associated with the president’s Twitter account are the result of private 
actions -- the action of Donald J. Trump not clothed in the official powers of the presidency and 
the action of Twitter, a private company, in creating the ability to block individuals from one’s 
Twitter account.303   
 Furthermore, defendants argue, in the alternative, that if the decisions regarding the 
contours of the interactive space associated with @realDonaldTrump are not considered private 
speech, they should be considered government speech, which is immune from analysis under the 
Free Speech Clause and under the public forum doctrine.304  Defendants compare the president’s 
decisions regarding who is allowed to follow him to the government’s decisions in Pleasant 
Grove v. Summum regarding which privately donated monuments to allow in a public park.305  
As in Summum, discussed above, defendants argue that the president’s choices regarding 
conversations in response to his tweets constitute government speech.306  
Finally, defendants argue that the interactive space associated with Trump’s Twitter 
account is not a public forum because it is property controlled by Twitter, a private company, not 
property that is owned and controlled by the government.  They further claim that Trump has not 
intentionally opened up this space for public discourse, as is necessary to create a designated 
                                                        
302 See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 13, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)  
303 See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 12, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)  
304 See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 15, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)  
305 See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 15, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)  
306 See discussion supra. 
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public forum.307 Rather, defendants argue, Trump’s Twitter account and the interactive space 
associated with it is merely the speech of the president participating in a privately run and 
privately controlled forum, which is not susceptible to analysis under the public forum 
doctrine.308 
 In Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump, the district court began its examination of 
the plaintiffs’ public forum claims and defendant's defenses, consistent with the Supreme Court's 
teachings on the subject, by focusing on the nature of the access sought by plaintiffs and the type 
of space to which they sought access.309  The court explained that in order to analyze plaintiffs’ 
public forum claims, it must begin by focusing on the access sought by the speakers.310 The court 
found that the access sought by the Trump/Twitter plaintiffs was narrow and specific in scope, 
similar to the access sought by the plaintiffs in the Cornelius v. NAACP311 and Perry Education 
Association312 public forum cases, discussed above.313  In particular, the access sought by the 
Trump/Twitter plaintiffs was not the right to access the president’s @RDT Twitter account as a 
whole, which would include the right to decide the content of the president’s tweets314 and/or the 
                                                        
307 See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 12, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)  
308 See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 13, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia 
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)  
309 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 565. 
310 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 565. 
311 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Edu. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 793 (1985) (addressing access to the 
Combined Federal Campaign). 
312 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 39 (1983) (addressing access to 
the interschool mail system and teacher mailboxes in the Perry Township schools). 
313 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566. 
314 The court explained, not surprisingly, that the content of each tweet from the @RDT twitter account 
fell comfortably within the category of government speech, since these tweets consist solely of the speech 
of the president or other government officials who help him craft such tweets.  See Knight First 
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 571. However, the court went on to determine 
that the same could not be said of the interactive space for replies and retweets associated with each tweet 
sent from the @RDT account, as discussed infra. See id. at 572.  
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right to decide whom the president follows on his @RDT Twitter account.315   Rather, the access 
the Trump/Twitter plaintiffs sought was the narrow and specific right to express themselves 
within the interactive space associated with each of the president’s tweets by replying to, 
retweeting, and/or liking those tweets and otherwise participating in the account's interactive 
space -- the right that is enjoyed by the 53 million other individuals who follow the president on 
his @RDT Twitter account.316 Thus, the court appropriately narrowed the relevant inquiry and 
found that the proper subject of the forum analysis was not the @RDT Twitter account as a 
whole but the interactive space associated with each of the president’s tweets from this account -
- the space that allows for the president’s 53 million Twitter followers to engage and interact 
with, comment on, praise, criticize, expound upon, and accept or reject the statements made by 
the president.317  
 The court then examined whether this specific forum -- the interactive space associated 
with each of the president’s tweets from his @RDT account -- constituted a forum that was 
government-controlled.318  The judge rejected at the outset the arguments advanced by Trump -- 
that because the underlying forum was owned by Twitter, a private company, and was not a 
physical place, it did not constitute a public forum for purposes of First Amendment analysis.319  
While recognizing that many of the Supreme Court’s public forum cases involve government-
owned physical property like streets, parks, and public school facilities, the court explained that 
public forums have also been recognized in cases where the forum at issue was owned by private 
                                                        
315 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 565.  
316 See Complaint at 25, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). See also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump.  
317 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566.  
318  See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566-70. 
319 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249489 
63  
entities but controlled by the government.320  As discussed above,321 in cases like Southeastern 
Promotions v. Conrad, the Supreme Court found that a privately-owned theater space to which 
access was controlled by the government constituted a public forum, notwithstanding the fact 
that the city did not own the forum for expression at issue.322  The judge correctly held that the 
underlying form of ownership of the forum is not dispositive;323 rather, the relevant inquiry 
concerns the entity that is exercising control over access to the forum.324  In addition, the court 
explained that it was irrelevant that the forum under consideration (the interactive space 
associated with Trump's Twitter account) did not have a physical situs, as the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly explained that a public forum may “lack a physical situs”325 and may be “a forum 
more in the metaphysical sense than in a spatial or geographic sense.”326   The court held that the 
non-physical forum at issue in the Trump/Twitter case was one that was government-
controlled.327 While recognizing that Twitter controls the basic features of the Twitter platform, 
the court found that it was Trump (and government officials working under his direction) who                                                         
320 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566. 
321 See text accompanying notes x - y.  
322 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (using examples of 
privately-owned public forums) (citing Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975)).  
323 It is worthwhile to recall language from the Supreme Court’s seminal public forum case, in which it 
instructed that the issue of who held formal title to the property at issue was not dispositive: “Wherever 
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, 
and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.  [Therefore,] the privilege of a citizen of the United States to use 
the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions . . . must not, in the guise of 
regulation, be abridged or denied.” Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) 
(emphasis added).  
324 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (“This requirement of 
governmental control, rather than complete governmental ownership, is . . .  consistent with forum 
analysis's focus on ‘the extent to which the Government can control access’ to the space and whether that 
control comports with the First Amendment”) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Edu. Fund, 
473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)). 
325 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (quoting Cornelius, 473 
U.S. at 801). 
326 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (quoting Rosenberger, 
515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995)). 
327 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566. 
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exercises control over access to the specific forum at issue in this case, including which of the 53 
million individuals who follow Trump’s account will be blocked from further participation in the 
interactive space associated with the president’s tweets.328  
The central issue that the court next considered was whether the government-controlled 
forum at issue -- the interactive space associated with each of the president’s tweets from his 
@RDT twitter account  -- was subject to forum analysis under the First Amendment or instead 
constituted government speech that was immune from forum analysis under the First 
Amendment.329 In analyzing this crucial government speech versus forum analysis issue, the 
court turned to the central cases of Pleasant Grove v. Summum,330 Walker v. Sons of the 
Confederate Veterans,331 and Matal v. Tam,332 in which the Supreme Court found the following 
factors to be most relevant to resolving this issue: (1) whether the forum was constrained by 
inherent selectivity and scarcity, including whether a public forum classification would “lead 
almost inexorably to the closing of the forum”333 or whether the forum was “capable of 
accommodating a large [amount of speech] without defeating its essential function”334; (2) 
whether the speech within the forum was closely identified in the public mind with the 
                                                        
328 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566-67 (“[T]hey control the 
content of the tweets. . . and they hold the ability to prevent, through blocking, other Twitter users . . . 
from accessing the @realDonaldTrump account . . . .”). 
329 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 570. 
330 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
331 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
332 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
333 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 571 (quoting Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009)). 
334 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 570 (quoting Summum, 555 
U.S. at 478). 
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government;335 and (3) whether the government maintained control over the speech in the 
forum.336  
Applying the first factor -- whether the forum was constrained by inherent selectivity and 
scarcity -- the court properly held that the forum composed of the interactive space associated 
with each presidential tweet was not characterized by inherent selectivity and scarcity.337  This 
forum was distinctly unlike the forum to which plaintiffs sought access in the Summum case 
(namely, access to a public park for the purpose of donating and erecting permanent 
monuments), such that application of the forum doctrine to the access sought by Summum would 
“almost inexorably lead to the closing of the forum.”338  Unlike the right of access to a public 
park to erect permanent monuments, the Trump/Twitter plaintiffs’ requested access was to a 
forum that is capable of accommodating -- and regularly does accommodate -- an unlimited 
amount of speech in the form of replies and retweets.339     
In considering the second factor -- whether the speech in the forum was closely identified 
in the public mind with the government -- the court properly found that while the president’s 
tweets themselves were identified in the public mind with the president, the same could not be 
said for the interactive space (individuals' replies, retweets, likes, etc.) associated with each 
presidential tweet.340  Notably, each reply to a presidential tweet is associated and displayed with 
the account information (including the picture, name, and Twitter handle) of the replying user 
                                                        
335 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 571. 
336 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 570 (quoting Matal, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1760). 
337 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572.  
338  See Summum, 555 U.S. at 480. 
339 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 573.The record showed that 
each tweet from @realDonaldTrump regularly engenders tens of thousands and upwards of hundreds of 
thousands of replies and retweets. Stipulation Paras. 41-43. 
340 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572. 
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and is not endorsed in any way by the government.341  Unlike the specialty license plates 
involved in the Walker case -- in which each specialty plate, in addition to bearing the specialty 
message, also had “TEXAS” prominently displayed on it, and was issued by the state as a form 
of official identification342 -- and unlike the permanent monuments accepted for display within 
the public park in Summum,343 the reply tweets at issue in the Trump/Twitter case are not 
associated in the public mind with the government.344  Rather, the speech at issue in the 
Trump/Twitter case is more akin to the speech at issue in Matal v. Tam345 -- the trademarks that 
private entities create and seek to secure for protection by the Patent and Trademark Office -- 
which the Court found to be associated in the public mind with private speakers, not with the 
government, and to be private speech not government speech.346 
Finally, in evaluating whether the interactive space associated with each presidential 
tweet constituted government speech, the court examined the third factor -- whether the 
government maintained control over the speech in the forum.347  The court observed that each 
reply tweet to a presidential tweet is controlled solely by the replying user herself, such that no 
other Twitter user (including the president) can alter the content of any reply, and that the 
government maintains no control over reply tweets (other than wielding the power to block the                                                         
341 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572 (emphasizing the 
“prominence” of the replying user’s account information in the replying tweet). 
342 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248 (2015) 
(emphasizing the “clear governmental nature of the plates”). 
343 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 472 (finding clear government speech in the monuments that “the City 
decided to accept”). 
344 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572 (“[T]he reply is unlikely 
to be ‘closely identified in the public mind’ with the sender, even when the sender of the tweet being 
replied to is a governmental one.”) (quoting Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017)). 
345 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
346 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760. Notably, the Supreme Court in Matal v. Tam warned against the 
government’s attempt to extend the government speech doctrine to a broader and broader array of 
circumstances, which would have the effect of diminishing the protections of the Free Speech Clause: 
“[i]f private speech could be passed off as government speech by simply affixing a government seal of 
approval, government could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints.” Id. at 1748. 
347 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572. 
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user from following the president on his @RDT Twitter account entirely).348  This is in contrast 
to the speech at issue on the specialty license plates in the Walker case, in which the state 
exercised “sole control over the design, typeface, color, and alphanumeric pattern for all license 
plates,” and was vested by law with the final authority to approve every specialty license plate 
design proposal before the design could appear on a Texas plate.349 The court held that such 
government control of speech, which supported the conclusion in Walker that the speech at issue 
was government speech not private speech within a public forum, is completely lacking from the 
forum at issue in the Trump/Twitter case, as neither the president nor any government official 
has the ability to control the replies, retweets, or other speech in the interactive space associated 
with each presidential tweet.  
In summary, applying the factors of whether the relevant forum was constrained by 
inherent selectivity and scarcity, whether the speech within the forum was closely identified in 
the public mind with the government, and whether the government maintained control over the 
speech in the forum, the court concluded that the interactive space associated with each 
presidential tweet constituted a public forum for private speech subject to the constraints of the 
Free Speech Clause, not government speech immune from the application of the Free Speech 
Clause.350 
Having concluded that the interactive space associated with the president’s Twitter 
account was not government speech and was properly subject to forum analysis under the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, the court then turned to a determination of 
                                                        
348 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572. 
349 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2249 (2015) (“Texas 
law provides that the State ‘has sole control over the design, typeface, color, and alphanumeric pattern for 
all license plates.’ The Board must approve every specialty plate design proposal before the design can 
appear on a Texas plate.”) (citing §504.005;  43 Tex. Admin. Code §§217.45(i)(7)–(8), 217.52(b)). 
350 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at  572.  
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which type of forum was involved -- a traditional public forum, a designated public forum, or a 
nonpublic forum.351 Because the Supreme Court has strictly limited the first category to its 
historical confines of public streets, sidewalks, and parks, the court quickly moved to an 
examination of whether the forum at issue in this case fell within the second or third type of 
forum.352 The Supreme Court has instructed that, in distinguishing designated public forums 
from nonpublic forums, courts must “look to the policy and practice of the government to 
ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate 
as a public forum.”353  The requisite government intent on this point may be inferred from a 
number of factors, including the government’s policy, past practice, the nature of the property, 
and its compatibility with expressive activity.354  Applying these factors to determine whether 
the government intended to open up the interactive space associated with each presidential tweet 
as a public forum, the court concluded that it did.355  Judge Buchwald explained that this 
interactive space is generally available to the public without limitation (except once an individual 
has been blocked by the president), the account was expressly designated as a means of 
communication with the American public at large, and the space is fully compatible with a 
substantial amount of expressive activity.356  As the Supreme Court recently recognized in 
Packingham v. North Carolina, social media sites like Twitter are the modern-day mediums 
through which citizens can “petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage with 
them in a direct manner.”357 Accordingly, the court held that the interactive space associated 
                                                        
351 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at  573. 
352 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 573-74. 
353 73 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
354 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-03. 
355 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574. 
356 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574. 
357 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
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with the president’s tweets on his @RDT Twitter account constituted a designated public forum 
for expression.358 
Having determined that the space at issue constituted a designated public forum, the court 
readily determined that the president’s blocking of the plaintiffs from following him on Twitter 
based on their viewpoint was unconstitutional.359  The Supreme Court has repeatedly and 
unequivocally held that viewpoint discrimination directed against speech that is otherwise 
permissible within a designated public forum is unconstitutional.360 The court explained that 
there was no conceivable way to interpret the president’s blocking of the plaintiffs after they 
criticized him or his policies other than as an act of viewpoint discrimination, which is flatly 
illegal within a designated public forum.361  Accordingly, the court awarded the declaratory 
relief sought by the plaintiffs and ordered the president and the other named defendants to cease 
blocking the plaintiffs from the president's @RDT Twitter account because of their views.362  
 
IV. Let Them Speak Their Minds in the Digital Town Hall: How Government Officials Can 
Craft Constitutional Social Media Policies 
 
 As the discussion of the Governor Hogan, the Commissioner Randalls, and the President 
Trump cases indicates, government officials’ social media sites, such as Facebook pages and 
Twitter accounts, that facilitate comments, questions, and debate by constituents and members of                                                         
358 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575. 
359 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575. 
360 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575. See Rosenberger v. 
Rector Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-31 (1995), discussed supra at text accompanying 
notes x - y; Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (“When government creates such a forum. . . 
‘viewpoint discrimination’ is forbidden”). 
361 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575. 
362 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 579. Although the plaintiffs 
also sought injunctive relief from the court in the form of a court order mandating the unblocking of the 
plaintiffs from the president’s @RDT Twitter account, the court declined to award such relief, in part 
because it concluded that declaratory relief was likely to achieve the same result as injunctive relief and in 
part because declaratory relief would be less intrusive on the prerogative of the executive and would be 
less likely to raise separation of powers concerns. See id. 
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the public should -- and likely will -- be viewed by courts for First Amendment purposes as 
designated public forums, in which viewpoint discrimination by government officials is flatly 
prohibited.  This means that deleting a constituent's critical comments is unconstitutional.  This 
also means that wholly blocking an individual from such forums is likely to be impermissible.  
However, government officials can craft policies that constitutionally prohibit certain speech 
under certain circumstances: (1) if the forum is a limited public forum that is limited to 
discussion by a certain class of speakers or certain subjects and the speaker or speech falls 
outside these limits, or (2) if the speech itself is not protected by the First Amendment.  I discuss 
each of these possibilities below. 
 Although it may be constitutionally permissible in certain circumstances for a 
government official to prohibit certain speech on the official’s social media site, courts will most 
likely find that it is never constitutionally permissible to outright block an individual from such a 
social media site that is open to the public, even if that individual has posted off-topic or illegal 
speech in the past. Such an act of blocking would be deemed a prior restraint on that individual’s 
(future) speech, which is presumptively unconstitutional.363 Although courts have upheld limited 
restrictions on individuals’ future speech -- such as gag orders imposed on those connected with 
judicial proceedings where necessary to protect fair trials364 or content-neutral, time, place, or 
manner injunctions imposed on individuals who have repeatedly violated the law in the past365 -- 
                                                        
363 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (“Viewpoint discrimination . . . is 
presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”). 
364
 See e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976). 
365
 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994) (upholding certain 
content-neutral provisions of a state court injunction that prohibited particular anti-abortion protestors 
from demonstrating and engaging in other advocacy efforts near abortion clinics and the homes of clinic 
employees); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 361 (1997) (upholding 
certain content-neutral provisions of state court injunction issued against fifty individuals and three 
organizations, including fixed buffer zones which prohibited demonstrating within 15 feet of abortion 
clinic doorways, parking lots, and driveways). 
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courts have never upheld the wholesale blocking of an individual from speaking in a traditional 
or designated public forum.  Therefore, blocking an individual from a government official's 
social media site will likely never pass constitutional muster. 
 If a government official opens up her social media site for questions and comments on all 
subjects, a court would likely view that site as a general purpose designated public forum and 
would strictly scrutinize any effort to prohibit speech within that forum on the basis of content or 
viewpoint.  As discussed above, courts will subject speech limitations within such general 
purpose designated public forums to the same scrutiny as speech restrictions within traditional 
public forums.366 However, when the government creates or designates a public forum by 
opening it up for speech, it does not have to open it up for the discussion of all subjects.367 The 
government can create a limited-purpose designated public forum -- or a “limited public forum” -
- that is dedicated to the discussion of certain topics and/or that is available only for a certain 
class of speakers.368  For example, a school district can constitutionally limit after-school use of 
school property to social, civic, educational, and recreational uses, while prohibiting political or 
                                                        
366
 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). The Perry court explained: 
In [traditional public forums or] quintessential public forums, … [f]or the State to enforce a 
content-based exclusion, it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. ... …[Similarly,] the Constitution 
forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a [designated public] forum generally open to 
the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place.  Although a State is not 
required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so, it is bound 
by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum…. [A] content-based prohibition 
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest....  Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry 
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). 
367 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Edu. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (“Control over access to 
a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn 
are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral) (citing Perry Educ. 
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49).  
368 See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993) (describing a 
limited public forum as “open only for designated purposes”). 
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commercial uses of such property.369 A city council can create an open microphone opportunity 
during a council meeting and allow speakers to address any issue on the council’s agenda, but 
prohibit discussion of topics that are not on the council’s agenda.  A state university can open up 
its classrooms for use by student organizations, but not by outside community groups. Such 
topic-based or speaker-based restrictions within limited purpose public forums are constitutional, 
so long as any prohibitions on speech within the limited public forum are also reasonable in light 
of the purposes and subjects of the forum and are not based on viewpoint. By expressly creating 
such a limited-purpose public forum, the government officials would be empowered to prohibit 
speech that fell outside of such topics, such as commercial advertisements.  Similarly, a 
government official could open up a Facebook page or Twitter account’s forums to speech on 
political and public interest topics, while prohibiting commercial advertisements or solicitation, 
for example, within that forum.   
 In addition, when government officials use social media sites, such as Facebook pages 
and Twitter accounts, that invite questions, comments, and debate by constituents and members 
of the public, they may constitutionally prohibit speech that is outside the protection of the First 
Amendment, including speech that amounts to a true threat,370 speech that constitutes fighting                                                         
369 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391-92 (holding that while it is constitutional to create a designated 
public forum with such limited purposes as social, civic, and recreational uses, it is unconstitutional to 
prohibit religious uses of such property); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 553 U.S. 98, 108-
09 (2001) (holding that while it is constitutional to create a designated public forum with such limited 
purposes as instruction in education, learning, the arts, social, civic, recreational, and entertainment uses 
pertaining to the community welfare, it is unconstitutional to prohibit the use of the property for religious 
purposes.) 
370 True threats -- statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals -- are statements that 
are not protected by the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). However, 
threatening speech regarding a government official may be more likely to be viewed as mere “political 
hyperbole” and therefore protected by the First Amendment. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 
(1969) (defendant’s statement “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights 
is L.B.J. [President Lyndon B. Johnson]” was not a true threat within the meaning of a statute that made it 
a crime to knowingly and willfully threaten the life of the president, but was rather a “kind of political 
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words,371 speech that is obscene,372 and speech that contains child pornography.373  While speech 
within the last two categories (obscenity and child pornography) is less likely to be posted on a 
government official’s social media site, and while the second category of unprotected speech 
(fighting words) appears to be an anachronism,374 it is not unrealistic to expect that speech that 
arguably falls within the first category of unprotected speech -- true threats -- would be posted in 
an online forum, and the government official who hosts the forum may constitutionally prohibit 
such speech.  However, the ultimate determination of the illegality of any such post must await a 
judicial determination, since speech cannot be censored by a government official prior to a 
judicial determination of its illegality, pursuant to the prior restraint doctrine.375  Under the prior 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
hyperbole” and a “crude offensive method of stating political opposition to the president”).  For a recent 
controversy regarding speech that was allegedly threatening to the President of the United States, consider 
the uproar over comedian Kathy Griffin’s picture of herself holding a replica of the decapitated head of 
President Trump. See https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/05/31/did-kathy-griffin-break-
law-her-photo-decapitated-trump/356840001/  
371 In the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Supreme Court held that 
“fighting words” -- words that “men of common intelligence would understand to be words likely to 
cause an average addressee to fight” -- were not protected by the First Amendment.   
372 In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court set forth the following three-part definition of obscene 
speech, which is outside the protection of the First Amendment:  “(a) whether the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to 
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).  But obscenity prosecutions that do 
not also involve child pornography prosecutions are relatively rare. See 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/us/28obscene.html (fewer than two dozen federal obscenity 
prosecutions have been brought that did not also involve child pornography). 
373 In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), the Court held that child pornography, defined as visual 
depictions of minors engaged in sexual activity, was outside the protection of the First Amendment. 
374 Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that fighting words are outside the protection of the 
First Amendment, since its 1942 decision in Chaplinsky, the Court has never since held that any speech 
actually fell within this category of unprotected speech. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 442, n.3 
(2011) (reiterating that the category of “fighting words” is outside the protection of the First Amendment, 
but holding that Westboro Baptist Church’s speech at military funeral -- including posters with the words 
“God Hates Fags” and “God Hates You” -- did not fall within this unprotected category). 
375 As I have explored in great detail elsewhere, any restraint on speech that is imposed by a government 
official prior to a judicial determination of the speech’s illegality constitutes a prior restraint on speech 
that is presumptively unconstitutional. See, e.g., Dawn Carla Nunziato, How (Not) To Censor: Procedural 
First Amendment Values and Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 Geo. J. Int'l L. 1123 (2011); Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 58 (1963).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249489 
74  
restraint doctrine, any restriction on or censorship of speech by a government official prior to a 
judicial determination of the speech’s illegality constitutes a prior restraint on speech that is 
presumptively unconstitutional.  Therefore, even if the government official believes that the 
speech at issue constitutes an unprotected true threat or falls within one of the other categories of 
unprotected speech discussed above, removal or censorship of such speech by the government 
official prior to a judicial determination of the speech’s illegality would constitute a 
presumptively illegal prior restraint.376  Accordingly, government officials have very limited 
authority to remove speech with the designated public forums constituted by their social media 
sites.  
Conclusion 
 When government officials, like Maryland Governor Larry Hogan and President Donald 
J. Trump, use social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to engage and interact with their 
constituents on matters related to their governance, they are creating modern-day public forums 
for speech.  Although the media itself in which these interactions take place is of recent vintage, 
allowing for interactions between those who govern and those who are governed has long been 
recognized as vital to our system of democratic self-governance. Such interactions between 
government officials and their constituents form the heart of our system of democratic self-
government and must continue to be protected from censorship in the digital age, which is why 
viewpoint discrimination within such forums is flatly unconstitutional under the Supreme 
Court’s well-developed public forum jurisprudence.  Despite the modern-day context of such 
interchanges, the interactions themselves remain at the core of the First Amendment's protections                                                         
376 See, e.g., New York Times v. United States (striking down Nixon Administration’s injunctions against 
publication of portions of The Pentagon Papers by New York Times and Washington Post, stating that 
“every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers [prior to judicial determination 
of the publication’s illegality] amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First 
Amendment.”) (per curiam) (Black, J., concurring). 
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for free speech.  The Court’s explanation of this point remains as important today as when the 
Court ushered in the public forum doctrine eighty years ago:  
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its 
citizens to [consult] in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. 
. . . Such use of [public forums] has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, 
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.  The privilege of a citizen of the United 
States to use [public forums] for communication of views on national questions . . . must 
not . . . be abridged or denied.377 
 
Whether public forums are recognized in the town square or in the Twittersphere, these forums 
remain vital to our system of democratic self-government and must continue to be protected from 
government censorship in the digital age. 
                                                        
377 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 494, 513-16 (1939). 
